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1. Introduction 
Innovation is the primary driver of economic growth and is “the fundamental impulse that 
keeps the capital engine in motion” (Schumpeter, 1934). It is also risky; firms may not realize 
profits from innovation in the short term. It sometimes even takes years for firms to obtain profits 
from innovative activities or it may not be profitable at all. Although public firms can take 
advantage of risk sharing across investors, they experience agency problems. Pressures to beat 
quarterly earnings targets given by analysts (Porter 1992; He and Tian 2013) and concerns of being 
fired owing to poor performance (Kaplan and Minton 2006) induce managerial short-termism. 
Previous studies suggest that monitoring from institutional investors (Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales 2013), and external predator pressure (Atanassov 2013), facilitate innovation, yet other 
studies (He and Tian 2013; Fang, Tian, and Tice 2014) show that excessive monitoring hinders 
firm’s innovation. Thus, identifying effective monitoring mechanisms that reduce the agency 
problem and support long-term investments is critical in fostering innovation at the firm level. In 
this study, we examine the role of internal governance stemming from the difference in expected 
horizons between a CEO and his or her subordinates on innovation efficiency.  
Generally, CEOs have short horizons in the firm, their personal interests are not always 
aligned with those of shareholders, and they may not act as faithful agents.1 It is documented that 
CEOs may reduce firm’s future investments (Stein 1988, 1989; Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen 
2017), decrease investment quality (Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2016), discourage risk-taking 
(Holmstrom 1982), or overinvest to signal investment opportunities to the market (Bebchuk and 
Stole, 1993). To restrain the negative impact of CEO’s limited horizon on firm’s long term goals, 
Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011) propose a bottom-up governance mechanism through which 
subordinate managers with longer horizon can force the CEO to focus on the long-term future of 
the firm. This internal governance theory assumes that 1) subordinate managers are, generally, 
younger than the CEO, and 2) they are likely to succeed him or her. Under these conditions, 
subordinate managers could compel the CEO to extend his or her investment horizon to coincide 
with that of the firm to keep the managers motivated and preserve their contribution to the firm’s 
cash flow.  
                                                          1 The average CEO tenure is only about 5 years. (Equilar, 2018) 
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Subordinate managers have the desire to allocate a firm’s resources properly and invest in 
its future, especially if they see considerable scope for career development (Acharya, Myers and 
Rajan, 2011). They face a greater risk of finding a job with comparable compensation package 
(Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin 2016). With many more years of employment remaining, they have a lot 
at stake and they care about the long-term success of the firm. In addition, they are also the 
implementers of long-term investment as they possess firm-specific knowledge and experience. 
Their day-to-day contribution to firm’s operations and decision-making, ample experience in the 
business, and superior insight about the industry compared to other external monitors such as 
independent directors, analysts, and institutional investors make them better suited to help the CEO 
allocate future investments efficiently.  
Creativity may decline with age, though business skills increases with experience. (Liang, 
Wang, and Lazear (2018)). Statistics show that subordinate managers are, consistently, younger 
than the CEO with an average and median age difference of approximately four years.2 In addition, 
both academic and professional studies provide strong evidence that approximately 70-80% of 
new CEOs are internally promoted (DeVaro and Morita, 2013; Eisfeldt and Kuhnan, 2013).3 These 
results echo the key assumptions of the internal governance theory. Hence, following Acharya, 
Myers, and Rajan (2011), we use the difference between the CEO’s age and the subordinate 
managers’ average age, along with other alternative measures, to capture the difference in horizons 
inside the top management team.4  
Our focus of difference in horizons differs from previous theoretical and empirical works 
on how executives’ horizons affect firms’ innovative activities.5 While existing literature generates 
conflicting predictions and evidence on the relationship between executives’ horizon and long-
term investments, our conjecture is primarily based on the difference in horizons of these two 
group of players inside the top management team. In the presence of a principal-agent relationship, 
we hypothesize that teams comprised of multiple agents with different appropriation horizons may 
                                                          2 Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the age difference between the CEO and his or her immediate subordinates by year and firm quintiles. 3 A recent report published by Chief executive magazine shows that 78% of firms have internally sourced CEOs. 4 Section 3.3 provides detailed discussion of different measures of internal governance.   5 Previous theoretical literature proposes two competing arguments on how executives’ expected horizon can impact managerial decision-making in general. Market learning models developed by Holmström (1999) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) predict that younger executives invest less aggressively, as they are more risk-averse. On the other hand, the managerial signaling model developed by Prendergast and Stole (1996) predicts that younger managers make more and bolder investments compared to their older counterparts. 
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help the firm to focus on long-term investments through internal monitoring executed by 
subordinate managers. When aspiring younger managers engage in firm-specific learning effort to 
generate cash flow and simultaneously provide checks and balances to an older CEO, we expect 
innovation efficiency to increase as a result. 
An alternative argument might suggest that an innovative firm in need of a steady hand 
with operational experience could hire older managers that would increase firm’s innovative 
efficiency by helping the young dreamers – CEOs – make rational decisions about allocation of 
R&D resources. Whether this organizational structure works depends on subordinates’ motivation 
to contribute, the relative power and constraints which the two parties inside the firm’s top 
executive team impose on each other. In sum, the impact of the difference in horizons on 
innovation efficiency is an empirical question that may vary with firm’s characteristics and top 
management team composition. 
In this research, we direct our attention to innovation efficiency to portray a complete 
picture of the innovation process. Most of the literature on innovation research focuses on the 
quantity of innovation or subsequent citation with limited or no attention devoted to the private 
value gained from innovative activities or of the resources devoted toward such activities (Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005; Nicholas 2008). Directing the attention toward innovation efficiency 
rather than the quantity of corporate innovation may avert the potential problem that results are 
driven by a huge number of minor scientific advances with limited impact on the firm’s valuation 
and/or its competition. Our main measures of firm’s innovation efficiency are the number of 
patents, citation-weighted patents, and the market value of granted patents scaled by R&D 
spending. To capture all aspects of a firm’s quantity quality and market reaction innovative 
activities, 
To answer our research questions, we assemble a rich panel dataset of Standard & Poor 
(S&P) 1500 major US firms from 1992 to 2010 containing time-varying information on firms’ top 
management team, financial characteristics and innovation efficiency. We find a robust positive 
association between the difference in horizons, and innovation efficiency. We document that firms 
whose non-CEO executives’ horizon exceeds the CEO’s horizon have a higher number of patents, 
more citation-weighted patents, and greater market value for granted patents per R&D expenditure. 
To alleviate the spurious correlation concern and disentangle whether the association between 
difference in horizons and innovation efficiency is driven by younger managers vs. younger 
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dreamers CEOs, we split our sample into positive (i.e., CEO’s age exceeds the average age of the 
non-CEO executives) and negative horizon subsamples. According to our prediction, this positive 
association should only manifest in the positive horizon subsample. Our results confirm this 
prediction. For the negative horizon subsample, the relationship between the difference in horizons 
and innovation efficiency is insignificant, which is consistent with the argument that limited-
horizon older subordinates may lack the motivation to contribute to the innovation process and 
hence unable to help a younger CEO to make better R&D allocation decisions. Overall, our results 
are also consistent with the prediction that non-CEO executives with a longer horizon provide an 
effective governance mechanism to push the CEO to focus on long-term goals.  
Our results also suggest that internal governance is contingent upon the importance of 
subordinate managers and the distribution of power within the top management team. We further 
find that non-CEO monitoring is effective only when the CEO is close to retirement and if the 
CEO is a generalist, who most likely needs subordinate managers’ (implementers) support and 
expertise to determine the best allocation of firms’ investments. In addition, we find that the impact 
of internal governance is stronger when the number of non-CEO executives on the board increases. 
These results are consistent with previous literature that suggests that the presence of non-CEO 
executives on the board of directors increases their power and improving the monitoring role of 
the board (Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 
2011).6 On the other hand, the impact of internal governance is weaker for firms in which the CEO 
assumes greater power compared to his or her industry peers. Further, we find that the impact of 
internal governance on innovation efficiency is unaffected by the CEO’s overconfidence. 
To reaffirm the causal relationship between internal governance and innovation efficiency, 
we use Research Quotient (RQ) as an alternative measure of innovation efficiency. Previous 
literature has raised some concerns about the limitations of patent-based innovation data (Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001, 2005; Chen, Leung, and Evans 2016).7 Hence, the use of RQ as an 
alternative measure can help alleviate concerns that our results are driven by patent and citation-
based innovation. RQ is defined as the percentage increase in revenue from a 1% increase in R&D 
                                                          6 Masulis and Mobbs (2011) investigate the role of inside directors in the firm. They find that firms with inside directors holding outside directorship have better operating performance and market-to-book ratios, make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. 7 In this study, we use newly collected patent data from Kogan et al. (2017). According to Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2017) this patent data is truncation free and it overcomes the limitations of that NBER patent dataset that has been heavily used in innovation literature. 
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expenditure, and it captures the firm-specific output elasticity of R&D (Knott, 2008). Firm-level 
financial data are used to estimate RQ rather than patent data. Using RQ, we find that our results 
hold for both our main measure of the difference in horizons and alternative measure of non-CEO 
executives’ horizon. 
Although we argue that younger subordinate managers can improve firms’ innovation 
efficiency through monitoring CEO’s long-term investment allocation decisions, our results may 
be subject to potential endogeneity. This type of endogeneity can be viewed as a self-selection 
issue where younger executives with longer expected horizons might choose firms with longer 
horizon investments. Thus, the observed positive association could be related to omitted variables 
that affect both the managers-firm self-selection process and the ultimate innovation efficiency 
output. To address these concerns, we first use propensity score matching (PSM) to test the 
counterfactual using our observational data (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We match with 
replacement high-internal governance firms with low internal governance firms on all confounding 
control variables. Our results show positive and statistically significant average treatment effects 
(ATE), where firms with high internal governance experience greater innovation efficiency.  
In addition, we use the instrumental variable approach as an alternative identification 
strategy to account for other sources of endogeneity, including unobservable heterogeneity and 
simultaneity. Following Serfling (2014), we use the ratio of the average consumer price index 
(CPI) in the birth year of subordinate managers divided by the CPI in the year when the CEO was 
born. A higher ratio corresponds to a larger age difference as CPI is expected to increase over the 
years. This instrument is likely to be valid and meets both relevance and exogeneity conditions. 
Our instrument is increasing with age difference, our main measure of the difference in the horizon. 
In addition, we expect no relation between a firm’s innovation output in recent years and CPI in 
the birth years of its executives. Our results confirm that the predicted internal governance 
exercised by the non-CEO executives is effective in increasing firms’ innovation efficiency. 
Furthermore, to address the potential omitted variables problem, we include a long list of control 
variables and various fixed effects. We additionally control for various CEO characteristics that 
are known to affect a firm’s innovation activities, including age and compensation package. Our 
results hold and are consistent across various partitions of the data, which further help alleviate the 
endogeneity concern as it is less likely for omitted variables to explain our results in both the 
subsamples and the entire sample.  
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 This research contributes to the literature of several fields. To the best of our knowledge, 
our study is the first to test the impacts of the senior executives’ horizon and the difference in 
horizons within a management team on firm innovation efficiency. This study is closely related to 
the growing literature that studies managerial characteristics and their impact on firms’ long-term 
investment and innovation activities (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Custódio and Metzger 
2014; Yim 2013; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2017; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2016; Ederer and 
Manso 2013). However, the novelty of this study lies in focusing on the distinction between the 
CEO and his or her subordinates’ horizons. More importantly, the horizon of the implementers or 
non-CEO executives is highly significant to a firm’s innovation efficiency owing to their 
importance in the firm’s innovation process. The in-depth knowledge of non-CEO executives 
along with their career and personal motivation to be the next CEO improves a firm’s investment 
agenda, as shown in higher innovation quantity, quality, and market value generated for granted 
patents per R&D expenditure. Our findings regarding the horizon of the managers echo the theory 
prediction and the international evidence presented by Liang, Wang, and Lazear’s (2018). 
In addition, this study is related to the previous literature that examines how different 
governance mechanisms help improve firms’ innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 
2013; Tian and Wang 2014; Atanassov 2013; O’Connor and Rafferty 2012; Sapra, Subramanian, 
and Subramanian 2014). However, our paper is different from previous studies that focus solely 
on the CEO, by providing empirical evidence that internal governance executed by inside 
managers matters. This study also differentiates itself from the tournament literature (Kini and 
Williams 2012; Bushman, Dai, and Zhang 2016; Shen and Zhang 2017) by focusing on the impact 
of divergence in expected horizons in the top management team rather than the pay gap. Although 
the pay gap is one of the most important incentives to senior executives, it would not be as 
important if the subordinates do not have a sufficiently long horizon in the firm.  
Our research has strong implications for how corporate governance can improve a firm’s 
innovation. An optimal structure of senior executives should be a good mixture of talents with 
diversified career horizons. A more dictatorial, entrenched CEO could use his or her power to 
discourage long-term investments that lead to more innovation. A more democratic CEO may 
listen to his or her subordinate colleagues and support the long-term goals for the company, and 
thus generate more innovation. Firms having senior executives with diversified horizons are 
expected to be more innovative and competitive over the long run. To this end, our findings are 
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closely related to the broad literature on whether centralized power or group decision-making leads 
to better firm performance (Adams, Almeida, Ferreira, 2005).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, sample, and construction of variables. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Departing from the theoretical and empirical literature, which focuses on the CEO, recent 
theoretical research argues that the top management team includes diverse agents with divergent 
horizons and preferences (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009; Acharya, Myers, and Rajan 2011). 
Particularly, the immediate subordinates of CEOs are critical contributors, and they provide checks 
and balances in the firm and influence corporate decisions. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) 
conclude that “control need not be exerted just top-down, or from outside; it can also be asserted 
bottom-up.” Therefore, a bottom-up governance mechanism exercised by subordinates who have 
an extended horizon in the firm compared with a short-term oriented CEO is a force in corporate 
governance that needs to be carefully studied. According to Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011), 
although the CEO is the highest-ranked executive within a firm’s managerial hierarchy, he or she 
is not the sole productive asset in the firm. The CEO needs the cooperation of his or her 
subordinates to operate the business. An older CEO with a shorter career horizon than one’s 
subordinates may extract rents from the firm at the cost of the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
However, younger subordinate managers, in turn, may have a long-term interest in the firms’ 
prospects, especially if they see sufficient scope for career advancement within the firm (i.e., 
become the next CEO) (Prendergast 1999). If subordinate managers realize that CEO misuse 
firm’s resources, leaving nothing behind, they will have no incentive to exert effort, and the firm’s 
cash flow and the efficiency of future investment will fall significantly. 
Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) derive a theoretical model in which the firm is 
organized as a two-agent hierarchy: a decision-maker and an implementer. Both have their own 
intrinsic preferences over potential projects. The model suggests that dissent between the two 
agents can be useful for organizational efficiency. It forces the decision-maker (CEO) to use 
objective information and give less preference to their own bias toward a specific project to keep 
implementers (subordinates) motivated. They further argue that dissent can be optimal, in 
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particular, when the exchange of information between the two agents is useful, and the uncertainty 
of projects is high. Along the same line, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that internal managers are 
the most critical source of private and firm-specific information, which increase their power and 
ability in making corporate decisions. More recently, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) and Cheng, Lee, 
and Shevlin (2016) show empirically that non-CEO executives play an essential role in improving 
internal monitoring because of their firm-specific knowledge and experience.  
The previous discussion suggests that the divergence of horizons or the dissent in top 
management team may bring about a new source of governance mechanism executed by non-CEO 
executives. The competing horizons inside the firm’s top executives’ team may impose a 
counterpressure on the CEO to avoid his or her short-termism behavior and focus on long-term 
goals. The importance of subordinate managers is not limited to contribution withdrawal but also 
associated with their firm-specific knowledge to elicit better decision-making from the CEO. 
Previous literature provides evidence that subordinate managers can enhance a firm’s operational 
efficiency and financial transparency to effectively constrain value-destroying behavior on the part 
of the CEO (Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin 2016; Jain, Jiang, and Mekhaimer 2016).8  
To demonstrate how the difference in horizons between the CEO and his or her immediate 
subordinates can enact internal governance mechanism to help the firm survive and invest for its 
future, Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) consider a partnership between an older CEO and 
younger manager, who will be the future CEO. The incumbent CEO decides on firm’s investment 
plan and accordingly, the manager decides how much he or she will engage in firm-specific 
learning effort to generate cash flow. In this setting, the CEO has the incentive to invest if, and 
only if, the investment motivates the manager to exert greater effort that will increase current cash 
flow and consequently CEO’s compensation. The investment plan is also important to the manager 
because it affects the firm value that the manager inherits in the future. Hence, if subordinate 
managers’ contribution is important to the CEO, the CEO investment horizon can effectively be 
lengthened to coincide with that of the firm to keep subordinate managers motivated. 
To investigate the relationship between internal governance, primarily stemming from the 
difference in horizons, and innovation efficiency, we test the following hypothesis.  
                                                          8 In their theoretical model, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that one of the most important sources of firm-specific information to the board is the information that comes from non-CEO executives. 
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H1: Internal governance reflected in the difference in expected horizons within top executives is 
positively associated with firms’ innovation. 
Internal governance or bottom-up governance exercised by non-CEO executives depends 
on the composition of the top management team. Huffman, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016) show that 
an elderly population applies higher discounting rate toward future uncertain cash flows, and this 
pattern affects their social economic behavior. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that CEOs 
close to retirement lose appetites to invest in long-term investments. CEOs with a short-expected 
horizon may bypass investments with long-term payoffs or overinvest to deliver the message that 
they care about investment opportunities (Bebchuk and Stole 1993). Under such circumstances, 
when the CEO lacks long-term incentives, internal governance may be critical to a firm’s future. 
The negative impact of CEO horizon on firm’s long-term investments echoes the theory prediction 
and the international evidence presented by Liang, Wang, and Lazear’s (2018), and calls for an 
efficient “cure” in the corporate setting. To understand the impact of the CEO’s expected horizon 
on the internal governance effectiveness, we test the following hypothesis.  
H2: The positive association between internal governance and firm’s innovation efficiency is 
stronger when the CEO is close to retirement.  
We further investigate the impact of CEO’s power on the effectiveness of internal 
governance. As stated by Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009), a CEO, the primary decision-maker, 
needs to provide sufficient motivation to her subordinates, the implementers, to support their 
investment agenda. Previous literature suggests that as the CEO’s power increases, the monitoring 
incentive inside the firm decreases (Ryan and Wiggins 2004; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 2005; 
Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2016). Consistent with this argument, Acharya, Myers, and Rajan 
(2011) suggest that internal governance is most effective when both the CEO and the subordinates 
are important and contribute to a firm’s cash flow. However, if the CEO dominates the firm, there 
is much less incentive for subordinate managers to monitor the incumbent CEO. To investigate 
the role of CEO’s power on the effectiveness of internal governance, we create an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the CEO’s total pay is above the median CEO’s total pay in 
the same year and operating industry. To study this relationship, we test the following hypothesis. 
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H3: The positive association between internal governance and a firm’s innovation efficiency is 
weaker when the firm is led by a powerful CEO. 
The role of subordinate managers in monitoring the CEO can take several forms. The direct 
approach may involve the withdrawal of contribution to the firm (Acharya, Myers, and Rajan, 
2011) or dissent in the top management team (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009; Landier et al. 
2013). In contrast, the indirect approach involves improving the oversight role of the board of 
directors. For example, Raheja (2005) argues that the board of directors use CEO succession to 
motivate inside directors to share their superior information to help the board implement higher 
value projects. Further, Harris and Raviv (2008) also present a theoretical model of optimal boards 
of directors. The study suggests that shareholders may be better off by the insiders-controlled board 
because it helps better exploit private information and improves shareholders’ value. From the 
empirical perspective, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that inside directors improve a firm’s 
operating performance and growth, make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, 
and overstate earnings less often.  
Given the previous literature, we argue that insiders on the board may have more room to 
exercise their power and influence over the CEO by helping the board to make informed decisions 
about the potential returns on long-term investments. We test the following hypothesis.  
H4: The positive association between internal governance and a firm’s innovation efficiency is 
stronger as the number of non-CEO inside directors increases. 
CEO experience is a key to the innovation process in the firm. Custódio, Ferreira, and 
Matos (2017) argue that given their diverse industry experience, generalist CEOs are better 
innovators. They build their argument based on the notion that generalist CEOs have higher 
mobility and show tolerance for failure due to their exposure to different industries. On the other 
hand, a specialist CEO with a more technical background may have an advantage. Specialist CEOs 
equipped with managerial skills in specific industries may invest in innovation efficiently, as they 
are better able to gauge value-enhancing investments in R&D and innovations and the expected 
return of these projects. Therefore, which CEO skills (generalist or specialist) matter for innovation 
and innovation efficiency is ultimately an empirical question. Our focus here is on the governance 
role of subordinates in fostering innovation, and we believe that a generalist CEO may need the 
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help of subordinates to allocate future investments of the firm better. Hence, we argue that the 
importance of subordinate managers and internal governance is higher when the CEO is a 
generalist. To investigate this argument, we test the following hypothesis. 
H5: The positive association between internal governance and a firm’s innovation efficiency is 
stronger when the CEO is a generalist. 
We also test the impact of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between internal 
governance and innovation efficiency. Previous literature suggests that overconfident CEOs may 
engage in unprofitable mergers or suboptimal investments because they routinely overestimate 
their abilities and underestimate the potential of failure (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). On the 
other hand, theoretical models (Bernardo and Welch 2001; Goel and Thakor 2008) and empirical 
evidence (Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012) suggest that overconfident 
CEOs are better innovators because they are determined to explore more and take greater risk. 
However, the impact of CEO overconfidence on internal governance exercised by non-CEO 
executives remains unclear 
Moore and Healy (2008) and Moore and Schatz (2017) argue that overconfidence has three 
facets: (1) overestimation of one’s actual performance; (2) overplacement of one’s performance 
relative to others; and (3) excessive precision in one’s belief. The latter two facets may negatively 
affect internal governance or subordinates’ incentive to contribute to the firm. If a CEO overplaces 
his or her contribution, preference, or abilities, then we should expect internal governance 
exercised by non-CEO executives to be less effective. The same applies to excessive precision in 
CEO’s belief. Hence, in this study, we argue that the existence of overconfident CEO may be 
disadvantageous or at least unsupportive to the effort of non-CEO executives to improve the firm’s 
innovation efficiency. To test this empirically, we have the following hypothesis: 
H6: Overconfident CEO would be unsupportive to internal governance efforts led by non-CEO 
executives to improve a firm’s innovation efficiency. 
3. Data and Variable Definitions  
To construct our sample, we use several databases. Our sample covers the period from 
1992 to 2010. We use Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database to collect executive information 
including age, compensation package, and other executive characteristics for the S&P 1500 firms. 
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Data on the CEO General Ability Index (GAI) are collected from Miguel Ferreira’s website 
(Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013).9 Financial and accounting data, including R&D expenditure, 
total sales, leverage, cash, and capital expenditure, are extracted from the Compustat database. 
Analyst coverage data are collected from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
dataset, while data on institutional holding are obtained from the Thomson Reuters 13F database. 
The variable definitions and their sources are summarized in Appendix A. 
3.1. Innovation Data  
Ever since Schumpeter’s (1934) study, technological innovation has been considered as a 
key driver of future economic growth (Solow 1957; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman 1990; Romer 1990; Kogan et al. 2017). Corporate innovation measures the realization 
of firms’ long-term R&D investments and determines firms’ competitiveness (Cho et al. 2016; 
Porter 1990; Porter 1992). Despite the growing body of innovation literature, quantifying and 
assessing the economic significance of firms’ innovation is an extremely challenging task. To 
measure innovation activities, previous literature has used the number of patents applied and issued 
(as a proxy for innovation quantity) and the subsequent number of citations (as a proxy for 
innovations scientific value). We focus on the efficiency by considering the resources devoted to 
innovations, R&D investments (input), and output variables of innovation such as the quantity, 
scientific value, and economic value of firms’ innovation activities.  
Our analyses use newly collected patent data from Kogan et al. (2017) (KPSS). The 
advantage of using KPSS is twofold. First, in addition to providing the number of patents and 
citations of innovation activities, KPSS uses financial data to estimate the economic value of each 
patent granted. Such a measure will help us distinguish between the economic value of the patent 
and the quantity and scientific value of innovation. The private economic value does not 
necessarily match the scientific value. For example, a patent may provide scientific advancement 
that may or may not restrict competition or generate large profits for the firm. More importantly, 
an innovation measure based on financial data is free of truncation problem often observed in 
reported innovation measures based on patent and citation data. When aggregated at the firm level, 
                                                          9 GAI is constructed to reflect the generality of CEO skills. The index considers five aspects of a CEO’s professional career: the number of (1) positions, (2) firms, and (3) industries in which a CEO worked; (4) whether the CEO held a CEO position at a different company; and (5) whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate. The data are available from 1992–2007.  
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we can highlight the value creation generated from the top management team’s efforts in investing 
in innovative projects. Second, KPSS data extend the innovation data to 2010 compared to NBER, 
which covers the period between 1975 and 2006. A comparison of NBER innovation data and 
KPSS data shows that 27% of KPSS’s collected data are not included in NBER. Furthermore, the 
NBER dataset has several limitations due to the time delay for a patent to be granted and cited 
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001, 2005; Chen, Leung, and Evans 2016). However, Dass, Nanda, 
and Xiao (2017) suggest that KPSS data are truncation-free and show that adjustments used in 
earlier works do not work well for NBER data. Our study uses the KPSS data to focus on the 
impact of internal governance on innovation efficiency. 
3.2. Innovation Efficiency  
R&D conducted by firms is viewed as a long-term investment activity that may or may not 
contribute positively to the firms’ net cash flows and overall market value. In this study, our focus 
is to assess a firm’s innovation efficiency or the private return to R&D spending of the firm. We 
merge our patent data with the CRSP/Compustat merged database. We also omit firms in industries 
that never patent in our sample. In addition, we omit financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6799) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4949). To minimize the impact of outliers, we winsorize all variables 
at the 1% level.  
In measuring the innovation efficiency, we focus on three facets of innovation: quantity 
measured by the number of patents, the scientific value measured by subsequent citation of patents, 
and the market value of innovation measured by the change in a firm’s valuation when the patent 
is granted.  
3.2.1. Patents  
Previous literature has used patent data to measure the quantity of innovation produced by 
a firm. To measure patent efficiency, we aggregate patents at the firm level and divide the total 
number of patents in the year t+n by R&D expenses in year t, as shown in equation (1). 
 ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௙,௧ = ܮ݋݃ ቆܲܣ ௙ܶ,௧ା௡ ܴ&ܦ௙,௧ + 1ቇ (1) 
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where ܲܣ ௙ܶ,௧ା௡ is the lead total number of patents applied for in the year t+n (where n =1 
or 2) and R&D is the research and development expenditure in firm f, year t. Previous literature 
suggests that using patent numbers as the sole measure of innovation may not capture the impact 
of a firm’s innovation activities. The number of patents is noisy because it can include many risky 
innovations that might be of no value or even hurt firm valuation.10 Hence, we use alternative 
measures to proxy innovation efficiency.  
3.2.2. Scientific Value of Innovation 
The citation is perceived as the scientific value of innovation. It is still under debate how 
citations of patents are related to firm valuation. For example, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) 
and (Nicholas 2008) show that firms with high cited patents are valued higher in stock markets. 
However, Abrams, Akcigit, and Popadak (2013) document that the relationship between patent 
citations and valuation is non-monotonic. A highly popular measure of the output of innovation 
produced by a firm is the number of citation-weighted (cw) patents. We use an analogous measure 
of this metric. The scientific value, citation-weighted patents (Θ௙,௧௖௪), is defined in equation (2): 
 Θ௙,௧௖௪ = ෍ ቆ1 + ܥ௝ܥఫഥ ቇ௝∈௉೑,೟
 (2) 
where ܥ௝  is the number of forward citations for patent j, ܥఫഥ  is the average number of 
citations received by all patents granted in the same year as patent j, and ௙ܲ,௧ denotes the patent set 
of firm j in year t. This scaling is used to adjust for citation truncation lags (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg 2005).  
 To measure the efficiency of firm f citation-weighted patents per R&D expenditure, we 
calculate per dollar investment citation-weighted patents yield as shown in equation (3): 
 ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௙,௧ = ܮ݋݃ ቆΘ௙,௧ା௡
௖௪  
ܴ&ܦ௙,௧ + 1ቇ (3) 
3.2.3. Stock Market Value of Innovation 
The ultimate objective of a firm’s innovation is to improve the firm’s growth opportunities 
and valuation. The importance of a new patent can be assessed through the change in the market 
                                                          10 See e.g., Forbes (2013) “For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just About Worthless.”   
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values of the firm. According to the KPSS model, on the patent issue date, the market reacts to the 
news by adjusting the value of the firm ∆ ܸ as follows: 
 ∆ ௝ܸ = ൫1 − ߨ௝൯ߦ௝ (4) 
where ߨ௝ is the market’s ex-ante probability assessment that the patent application is successful 
and ߦ௝  is the dollar value of patent j. The market reaction to the patent granted described in equation 
(4) may understate the total impact of the patent on firm value, since the information about the 
probability that a patent will be granted is known to the market before the uncertainty about patent 
application is resolved. The second step in determining the market value of the patent is to isolate 
the component of the return around patent issuance events that are related to the value of the patent. 
In particular, the stock price of innovating firms may fluctuate during the announcement window 
around patent issuance for reasons unrelated to innovation. Hence, it is important to account for 
measurement error in stock returns. To eliminate any unrelated market movements, KPSS focuses 
on the firm’s idiosyncratic return defined as the firm’s return minus the return on the market 
portfolio. The idiosyncratic stock return R for a given firm around the time that its patent j is issued 
is described in equation (5). 
 ௝ܴ = ௝߭ + ߝ௝ (5) 
where ௝߭ denotes the value of patent j—as a fraction of the firm’s market capitalization—and ߝ௝ 
denotes the component of the firm’s stock return that is unrelated to the patent. KPSS constructs 
the estimate of the economic value of patent, ξ, as the product of the estimate of the stock return 
due to the value of the patent and M, the market capitalization of the firm that issued patent j on 
the day prior to the announcement of the patent issuance. The computation is shown in equation 
(6).  
 ߦ௝ = (1 − ߨത)ିଵ 1N௝ ܧ[ ௝߭| ௝ܴ]ܯ௝  (6) 
 where ߨത is the unconditional probability of a successful patent application; N௝ is the total 
number of patents issued to the same firm on the same day as patent j; and ߥ௝ denotes the value of 
patent j. The stock market value of patents for a firm (Θ௙,௧௦௠) is thus the sum of the economic value 
of all patents by a given firm j in year t as shown in equation (7). 
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 Θ௙,௧௦௠ = ෍ ߦ௝
௝∈௉೑,೟
 (7) 
where ௙ܲ,௧ denotes the patent set of firm j in year t. 
To measure the efficiency of the market value of firm j innovation with respect to 
investments in R&D, we calculate per dollar investment innovation yield as shown in equation (8) 
for firm j in year t: 
 ݂݁ ௙݂,௧௦௠ = Θ௙,௧
௦௠ 
ܴ&ܦ௙,௧ (8) 
 
3.3. Internal Governance 
3.3.1. The Difference in Horizons Measured by Age Difference  
The strength of internal governance is expected to increase with key subordinates’ 
incentives and ability to monitor the CEO and to make contributions to the firm’s decision-making. 
In this study, we measure internal governance based on the relative horizons of the CEO versus 
the key subordinates. Executive age has been used as a proxy for horizons (Brickley, Linck, and 
Coles 1999; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Matějka, Merchant, and van der 
Stede 2009). Age captures the accumulation of individual attributes, experience, and aspiration for 
the future. It has proven to be an important determinant of executives’ decision-making (Serfling 
2014; Yim 2013). Our measure is based on Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011), who suggest that 
the age difference can capture the difference in horizons between the CEO and other subordinate 
managers. Our primary measure of internal governance or difference of horizons is calculated as 
follows. 
ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ܿ݁ ݅݊ ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊ݏ ൫ܣ݃݁ ܩܽ݌௙,௧൯
= ܥܧܱᇱݏ ܣ݃݁௙.௧ − ܰ݋݊_ܥܧܱ ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݅ݒ݁ݏᇱܣ݃݁௙,௧ (9) 
where ܥܧܱᇱݏ ܣ݃݁௙.௧ is the age of the CEO and ܰ݋݊_ܥܧܱ ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ′ ܣ݃݁௙,௧  is the 
average age of the top four subordinate managers for firm f at year t. Our measure provides a 
simple yet effective proxy to capture the difference in horizons within the top management team 
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for a firm. It also alleviates the problem of using raw age as a measure of the horizon as it may 
reflect executive attributes including sophistication, risk-taking, education, or experience.11  
To better understand our main measure of internal governance, we plot the mean and 
median age difference over our sample period of 1992-2010 in Figure A1. The median age 
difference is the smallest in 1992 with about 2.5 years difference between the CEO and his or her 
subordinates and reaches a maximum value of 4.5 around 2001-2003. The mean and median of 
difference in horizons are quite similar throughout the sample. Table A1 panel A provides annual 
summary statistics of the difference in horizons over the same sample period, while, panel B 
presents the descriptive statistics across firm size quintiles. We find that the mean age difference 
is monotonically decreasing as the firm size increases. Further, figure A2 shows that the difference 
in horizons is not entirely driven by one side of the top management team as both CEO age and 
average age of subordinates vary over time.  
Alternative Measures of Internal Governance: Non-CEO Executives’ Horizon 
To further examine the relationship between the horizon of non-CEO executives and a 
firm’s innovation efficiency, we use four alternative measures of executives’ horizon. We use the 
difference in horizon scaled by CEO’s age; non-CEO executives’ age, expected remaining horizon 
and their industry-adjusted horizon. Scaled difference in the horizon is defined as the age gap 
between the CEO and his or her subordinates scaled by CEO’s age. Executive age is defined as 
the average non-CEO executives’ age in firm i in year t. We expect that as the non-CEOs age, they 
would have less incentive to monitor the CEO and help direct a firm’s investment in high impact 
innovative activities. In other words, as non-CEO executives’ age increases, their expected 
remaining horizon in the firm decreases.  
To circumvent problems associated with using executives’ raw age, we also use the 
difference between the expected retirement age of 65 and the average non-CEO executives’ age 
for firm i in year t to proxy their expected remaining horizon.12 Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin (2016) 
use this measure to proxy internal governance executed by non-CEO executives and its impact on 
                                                          11 Raw age may be directly correlated to risk aversion, experience, or education, but the age difference between the CEO and the subordinates controls for the individual attributes (see, Ang, Cole and Lawson 2010; Lundstrom 2002; Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Bantel and Jackson 1989).  12 In unreported results, we show that our results are not sensitive to specific cutoffs. Our results are consistent when we use 67 as the expected retirement age.  
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real earnings management. This measure reflects the average remaining years of employment of 
non-CEO executives, considering a retirement age of 65 years. In addition, we use non-CEO 
executives’ industry-adjusted expected horizon, defined as the difference between the average 
executives’ age in the firm’s operating industry and the firm’s average of non-CEO executives’ 
age. A positive (negative) value indicates that, on average, non-CEO executives are younger 
(older) than their operating industry peers, and hence have higher (lower) expected employment 
horizon. 
3.3.2. Control Variables  
Following the previous literature, we control for firm and industry characteristics that are 
known to affect a firm’s innovation. We control for firm size (measured by the log of sales), 
profitability (measured by ROA), tangible assets (measured by property, plant, and equipment 
deflated by book value of total assets), growth opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q), financial 
constraints (measured by Z-Score), cash holding (measured by cash deflated by total assets), 
interest coverage (measured by interest expenditure divided by operating income), investment 
expenditure (measured by capital expenditure divided by total assets), leverage ratio (book value 
of debt divided by book value of total assets), and buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal year. In 
addition to firm-specific characteristics, we control for industry concentration (measured by 
Herfindahl index- HHI). We also control for other external governance mechanisms that may 
affect a firm’s innovation. For example, Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) suggest that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with higher innovation output. Moreover, He and Tian 
(2013) suggest that analyst pressure on managers impedes a firm’s investments in long-term 
innovative projects. Thus, we control for both institutional holdings and analyst coverage in all 
regression models.  
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 reports sample summary statistics. We find that the mean and median of the number 
of PAT are 42.73 and 7, respectively. Citation-weighted patent TCW has a mean and median value 
of 99.03 and 16.56, respectively. We also find that the market reaction to granted patents TSM has 
a mean of $740.52 million and $34.76 million median value. In this study, we focus on return on 
R&D expenditure by computing the number of patents, citation-weighted patents, and market 
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value of innovation per dollars of R&D expenditure. Every million dollar invested in R&D 
generates on average 0.28 patents, 0.99 weighted citations, and $2.49 million increase in market 
valuation. These statistics are consistent with previous findings. For example, Shen and Zhang 
(2017) report the average number of patents of 43.4 and the median value of 6, while patents 
generated for every million dollars invested in R&D is equal to 0.234. The statistics suggest that 
our sample is skewed and hence we use the logarithmic transformation to account for extreme 
values.  
Our sample also shows that the mean CEO’s age is 53.71 and the median is 54 years. As 
expected and suggested by Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011), our sample shows that there is a 
difference of about four years between the CEO’s age and non-CEO executives’ ages. We find 
that non-CEO executives’ age has a mean and median value of 49.91 and 50 years, respectively.13 
These results confirm that non-CEO executives on average have a longer expected horizon on the 
firm compared to the incumbent CEO. The age difference between the CEO and the subordinates 
ranges from -13.5 years to 23 years. The average age difference is 3.86 years, and the median value 
is 3.75 years. Moreover, Table 1 shows that on average non-CEO executives have about 15 years 
as expected remaining employment horizon, based on the retirement age of 65 years. On average, 
we find that the CEO compensation package is about 2.64 times that of subordinates’ average 
package. Additionally, following Core and Guay (2002), we include the delta and vega of CEO 
compensation portfolios (CEO Delta and CEO Vega). CEO Delta is the dollar change (in millions) 
in a CEO’s compensation portfolio if the stock price increases by 1%. CEO Vega captures the 
dollar change (in millions) in a CEO’s compensation portfolio if the stock return volatility 
increases by 1%. The mean values of CEO Delta and CEO Vega are $1.202 million and $0.102 
million, respectively. Descriptive statistics for external governance measures, including analyst 
followings, institutional ownership, and other control variables, are also reported in Table 1. 
  [Insert Table 1] 
4.2. Baseline Regressions 
In this section, we test the relationship between the internal governance proxied by the 
difference in horizons between the CEO and his or her subordinates on innovation efficiency. 
                                                          13 The summary statistics of the age difference are comparable to those reported by Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011). They show that across 1992–2008 the mean CEO age is 55.6 years and the mean non-CEO executive age is 51.6 years.  
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Table 2 presents our baseline regression results; panel A reports the regression results for the first 
two measures and Panel B reports the results for the market value of innovation. Model (1) 
provides baseline regression results by including only difference in the horizon and control 
variables; Model (2) controls for CEO’s age; and Model (3) adds CEO Delta and CEO Vega as 
additional explanatory variables. In all models, we include industry and year fixed effects. Our 
results show that the coefficients of age difference are positive and statistically significant. We 
find that as the difference in horizon measured by age difference increases, the quality, scientific 
value, and market value of innovation increases. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
conventional determinants of innovation, CEO age, CEO Delta, and CEO Vega. Our results are 
consistent with hypothesis 1 that internal governance, executed by non-CEO executives, helps 
firms better allocate their resources toward innovative activities that have the highest impact in 
scientific and monetary terms. We also find the coefficients of CEO’s age are negative and 
statistically significant for the three measures of innovation efficiency. These results are also 
consistent with previous literature that CEO aging and career concerns affect future investment 
strategies and the quality of such investments (Serfling 2014; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2016). 
The results also echo the findings of Gonzalez-Uribe and Groen-Xu (2017), that CEO’s horizon 
negatively affects R&D expenditure and innovation activities of the firm.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 To further understand the relationship between the difference in horizons within the top 
management team and a firm’s innovation efficiency, we split our sample into a positive horizon 
and negative horizon subsamples. A positive (negative) difference in horizons is defined as a 
positive (negative) age difference between the CEO and his or her subordinates: that is, the CEO 
is older (younger) than his or her subordinates. In essence, we should expect the improvement in 
innovation efficiency to be exclusive to firms with non-CEO executives who are younger than the 
current CEO. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 3 reports the regression results for the positive (negative) 
age difference group. The regression results confirm our conjecture that internal governance is 
effective only when the non-CEO executives have a longer horizon than the CEO. We find that 
the coefficients of age difference are positive and statistically significant exclusively for firms with 
positive age difference; however, it is insignificant for the negative age difference. These results 
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provide strong evidence that our measure, age difference, can capture the difference in horizons 
within the top management team.  
[Insert Table 3] 
These results are consistent with the previous literature that argues that bottom-up 
governance executed by insider non-CEO executives may help allocate a firm’s resources to 
projects that have a higher impact on the firm’s valuation and competitiveness (Acharya, Myers, 
and Rajan 2011; Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009; Landier et al. 2013). Our results suggest that 
firms might benefit from divergence in horizons inside the top management team. Internal 
governance can work even if the CEO has a limited remaining horizon or short-term interest in the 
firm’s future. The existence of insider stakeholders with extended horizons helps the top 
management team to stay focused on investments that are expected to provide higher returns in 
the future.   
4.3. Addressing Endogeneity  
One potential concern of our results is potential endogeneity. A firm’s internal governance 
or difference in horizons may also be related to unobservable variables that affect the firm’s 
innovation activities, leading to the observed positive association between internal governance and 
innovation efficiency. Although our baseline regressions and other tests control for variables that 
are known to affect a firm’s innovation along with controlling for industry and year variations, we 
may still spuriously capture the association between internal governance and innovation 
efficiency. To rule out this possibility, we employ two different tests. We use propensity score 
matching to compute the average treatment effect and the instrumental variable approach to 
account for other sources of endogeneity.  
4.3.1. Propensity Score Matching 
A possible explanation of the positive association between internal governance and 
innovation efficiency is the self-selection of younger non-CEO executives to work in a firm with 
higher innovation efficiency. To overcome sample selection bias, we use propensity score 
matching to match firms with above median internal governance with those below the median of 
internal governance on all the control variables from our baseline regression (Ghaly, Dang and 
Stathopoulos, 2017). Our matching procedure uses a nearest neighbor matching algorithm with 
replacement and common support. This approach can help us isolate unobserved heterogeneity 
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that may be correlated with our measure of internal governance and help us establish the causal 
relationship between internal governance and innovation efficiency. Panel A of Table 4 shows the 
average treatment effect, which is defined as the average causal effect of treatment (high internal 
governance) on innovation efficiency. We find that, for all our outcome variables, the average 
treatment effect is positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with our 
previous results that internal governance can help improve innovation efficiency.  
4.3.2. Instrumental Variable (2SLS)  
To further address the potential endogeneity, we estimate 2SLS regression using the ratio 
of average CPI in the birth years of subordinate managers divided by the CPI in the year when the 
CEO was born. Although we acknowledge the difficulty of finding a valid instrument for the age 
difference, the CPI ratio presents a strong candidate that meets both relevance and exogeneity 
conditions. Serfling (2014) used the CPI in the CEO birth year as an instrumental variable to study 
the impact of CEO’s age on a firm’s policies. Our instrument variable CPI (Sub)/CPI(CEO) is 
increasing with the age difference measure as we expect a higher CPI to correspond with a younger 
subordinate’s birth year compared to that of an older CEO, who probably would have lower CPI 
in his or her birth year. According to our descriptive statistics, we should have about 54 (50) years 
lag between a firm’s innovation efficiency at the current period and the CPI in the CEO’s 
(subordinates) birth year. Such extended lag will help our instrument to meet the exogeneity 
condition as the CPI levels do not affect current innovation. In addition, the results reported in 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that our instrument meets the relevance condition, where the first-stage 
F-statistic is highly significant. Our results confirm the positive association between the predicted 
variable of the difference in horizons between a CEO and his or her non-CEO executives and 
different measures of innovation efficiency. We find that the coefficients of the predicted value of 
the difference in the horizon are positive and statistically significant across all measures of 
innovation efficiency. Our results further alleviate the concern that potential endogeneity may 
drive our main results.   
 [Insert Table 4] 
4.4. Alternative Measures of Internal Governance: Non-CEO Executives’ Horizon 
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Recognizing the inherent limitation of a multidimensional and broadly defined measure of 
horizons, such as the relative age difference, we use several alternative internal governance 
measures that capture the incentive of subordinates to monitor CEOs and contribute as 
implementers. In this section, we use alternative measures of internal governance based on non-
CEO executives’ horizon as robustness check to our previous results. We use the scaled difference 
in horizons, average subordinate managers’ age, remaining horizon, and industry-adjusted horizon 
to investigate the relationship between subordinate managers’ horizon and a firm’s innovation 
efficiency. Table 5 reports the regression results. Our results suggest that non-CEO executives’ 
horizon is important determinant to innovation efficiency. We find that scaled difference in 
horizons, remaining horizon and industry-adjusted horizon of non-CEO subordinate managers are 
positively associated with innovation efficiency. We also show that innovation efficiency 
decreases along with the average age of non-CEO executives. Our results confirm that non-CEO 
executive career horizon is very important in improving all aspects of innovation efficiency 
(quantity, quality and economic value). These results confirm our previous findings and highlight 
the importance of singling out the horizon of non-CEO executives from that of the CEO.  
[Insert Table 5] 
4.5. Alternative Measures of Innovation Efficiency: Research Quotient (RQ)  
In the previous sections, we use the patent data collected by KPSS to measure firms’ 
innovation efficiency. Although previous literature suggests that KPSS is free of measurement 
errors and truncation bias (Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2017), we reassess our results using an 
alternative measure of innovation efficiency - Research Quotient. Research Quotient (RQ) is 
defined as the percentage increase in revenue from a 1% increase in R&D. RQ is the firm-specific 
output elasticity of R&D (Knott, 2008) estimated from financial data. In addition, it is a universal 
and unitless measure; thus, the interpretation of the results is uniform across different firms and 
industries.  
The regression results in table 6 confirm our previous findings. We find that the coefficients 
of internal governance proxied by the age difference are positive and statistically significant, while 
the CEO age coefficients are negative and statistically significant. These results confirm that 
internal governance exercised by non-CEO executives can improve R&D productivity or 
innovation efficiency. To further strengthen our inference, we use alternative measures of non-
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CEO executives’ horizon and find that our previous results still hold. These results rule out the 
possibility that our results are data-driven or hold only for patent-based measures of innovation 
efficiency. 
[Insert Table 6] 
4.6. When is Internal Governance Effective?  
In the previous section, we showed that internal governance is effective in improving a 
firm’s innovation efficiency. However, the dynamic of this bottom-up governance mechanism 
depends heavily on the distribution of power and the importance of different players inside the top 
management team. For example, if a CEO is young or has extensive power relative to other 
members of the top management team, he or she may dominate the contribution to the firm, and 
hence, internal governance may have little or no impact on CEO behavior. To investigate the 
effectiveness of internal governance, we further study this relationship under different scenarios, 
including when the CEO is close to retirement, possess more power relative his or her subordinates, 
or he or she is classified as a generalist CEO. 
4.6.1. CEO Horizon 
At different stages of the CEO’s career, he or she may use R&D expenditure for different 
purposes. For example, Bebchuk and Stole (1993) and Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) suggest 
that CEOs with shorter career horizon may choose to overinvest to signal the presence of 
investment opportunities, without much emphasis on the quality of investment. Along the same 
line, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that CEOs close to retirement lose incentives to focus 
on long-term investments. When the CEO’s horizon decreases, the chance that the immediate 
subordinates will succeed him or her is much higher. This may incentivize non-CEO executives to 
exert more effort to keep the firm investment activities as efficient as possible. To test this 
argument, we create an indicator variable, Old CEO, which takes the value of 1 if a CEO’s age 
exceeds the sample median CEO age, and 0 otherwise.  
[Insert Table 7] 
Table 7 presents the results. We find that the presence of older CEOs with a shorter 
expected horizon decreases firms’ innovation efficiency. The coefficients of Old CEO are negative 
and statistically significant for different measures of innovation efficiency. We also find that the 
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coefficients of the interaction term between the internal governance measured by the difference in 
horizons and the Old CEO indicator variable are positive and statistically significant. These results 
are consistent with hypothesis 2 and our prediction that, as a CEO ages and the second line 
managers become closer to replace him or her, internal governance is more effective in efficiently 
allocating a firm’s investments. The results also show that internal governance is only effective 
when the subordinates are close to replacing the incumbent CEO. The coefficients of difference in 
horizons are not statistically significant for all measures of innovation efficiency.  
4.6.2. CEO Power 
Another dimension that may affect the strength of internal governance influence on 
innovation efficiency is the CEO power. As suggested by Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) that 
internal governance is based on the concept of a rolling partnership between CEOs and their 
subordinates. For this partnership to succeed, both CEOs’ and their subordinates’ contributions 
must be important to the firm. If one party dominates the contribution, the other party does not 
have enough incentive to contribute to or monitor firms’ investments. Bebchuk, Cremers, and 
Peyer (2011) find that CEO dominance is associated with a significant decrease in firm 
performance. We use total pay of the CEO relative to his or her median industry peers. We create 
an indicator variable, CEO Power, which takes the value of 1 if the CEO total pay is greater than 
the median pay of other CEOs in the same operating industry during the same year and 0 otherwise.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Our results indicate that internal governance may lose its effectiveness in increasing a 
firm’s innovation efficiency if a powerful CEO leads the firm. Table 8 shows the regression results. 
We find that the coefficients of internal governance measured by the difference in horizons are 
positive and statistically significant. However, the interaction term between CEO Power and the 
difference in horizons is negative and statistically significant. These results confirm hypothesis 3 
is valid: the effectiveness of internal governance depends on CEO power. The results confirm 
previous findings that as the CEO’s power increases, the monitoring incentives of insiders decrease 
(Ryan and Wiggins 2004; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 2005; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2016).  
4.6.3. Subordinates’ power: Inside Directors 
An alternative channel through which non-CEO executives can exercise their power is 
improving the oversight role of the board. Non-CEO executives possess a wealth of information 
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about a firm’s long-term investments and its prospects. If non-CEO executives have an extended 
horizon in the firm compared to the CEO, they would have the ability and incentive to improve 
the monitoring role of the board through providing an accurate and reliable assessment of the 
firm’s future investments. Consistent with this argument, previous theoretical (Raheja, 2005; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008) and empirical works (Duchin et al., 2010, 
Masulis and Mobbs, 2011) suggest that non-CEO inside directors improve board performance. To 
investigate the impact of non-CEO executives serving as inside directors and their ability to 
enforce internal governance, we use the number of non-CEO directors on the board, extracted from 
the ExecuComp dataset, as an indirect proxy of non-CEOs power. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Table 9 reports the regression results. We find that non-CEO inside directors can help 
improve the internal governance to increase innovation efficiency. We find that the interaction 
terms between the difference in horizons and non-CEO inside directors are positive and 
statistically significant for the quantity and scientific value of innovation. On the other hand, we 
find that the coefficients of inside directors are positive and statistically significant for the stock 
market value of innovation measure. However, the interaction terms between inside directors and 
the difference in the horizon are positive, they are statistically insignificant for the market value 
measure. Our results suggest that the role of subordinate managers to improve the oversight role 
of the board may work as a complementary force to the difference in horizons inside the top 
management team to improve the private value generated from firms’ innovative activities and 
investments in R&D.  
4.6.4. Generalist CEO 
In this section, we scrutinize the influence of a CEO’s experience on the effectiveness of 
internal governance in improving innovation efficiency. Previous literature suggests that CEOs 
with greater tolerance for failure and higher risk exposure due to their diverse work experience 
may spur a firm’s innovation. Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2017) suggest that a generalist CEO 
improves a firm’s innovation efficiency because they acquire knowledge beyond the firm’s current 
technological domain and they can use their skills bank to target different innovative projects. 
Although this argument is valid, using the firm’s resources efficiently might be harder for a 
generalist CEO without the help of subordinates. To stimulate innovation efforts, the firm requires 
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the general skills of the CEO as well as firm-level skills of the subordinate managers. Hence, we 
argue that to achieve an efficient innovative investment, the firm would require general and firm-
specific knowledge of both parties within the top management team.  
To investigate this relation, we use CEO General Ability Index created by Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to classify our sample of CEOs into generalists versus specialists. We 
create an indicator variable, GAI, which takes the value of 1 if the CEO scores above the median 
GAI and 0 otherwise. Our results interestingly suggest that internal governance is exclusively 
effective in improving firms’ innovation efficiency when the CEO is a generalist. We find that the 
interaction terms between GAI and difference in horizons to be positive and statistically significant 
indicating that internal governance helps to increase the quantity, scientific values, and market 
reaction of granted patents for every dollar invested in R&D only when the CEO is a generalist. 
These results echo our previous results that internal governance is effective only when both parties 
inside the top management contribute to a firm’s cash flow and innovation process. We also find 
that generalist CEOs have a negative impact on innovation efficiency. These results emphasize the 
importance of generalist CEOs in the innovation process and whether they may spur the investment 
of the firm at the expense of inefficient use of a firm’s resources. Our results suggest that to achieve 
efficient investment, the top management team needs to include both general and firm-specific 
expertise.   
[Insert Table 10] 
4.6.5. Overconfident CEO 
We also test the impact of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between internal 
governance and innovation efficiency. Following previous literature (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 
2008; Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda 2015), we use the option-based measure to proxy 
CEO’s overconfidence. The intuition of this measure is to capture the extent to which the CEO of 
the firm retains in-the-money options that are vested. Retaining such options voluntarily after the 
vesting period in which exercise becomes permissible is viewed as being overconfident 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005; Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda 2015). To construct this 
measure, we collect options grant information from Execucomp. Next, for every CEO in our 
sample, we divide the value of all unexercised exercisable options by the number of options vested 
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and scale it by the price at the end of the fiscal year as reported in Compustat. To classify a CEO 
as overconfident, a CEO should score above the median value of our overconfidence measure.   
Table 11 reports the regression analysis. We find that internal governance is not effective 
in improving a firm’s innovation when the CEO is overconfident. We find that the interaction 
terms between the overconfidence indicator variable and difference in horizons are insignificant 
for all different measures of innovation. However, the coefficients of internal governance are still 
positive and statistically significant for quantity and the scientific value. These results are to some 
degree aligned with hypothesis 6. Overconfident CEOs may be unsupportive to internal 
governance efforts inside the firm as indicated by the negative coefficients, but the impact is not 
statistically significant. Thus, it is important to highlight that our results suggest that overconfident 
CEOs are limited in their ability to weaken or undermine the effort of internal governance inside 
the firm. Interestingly, internal governance is only marginally significant for the stock market 
value of innovation variable, while overconfident CEOs can bring value creation to the firm for 
their innovations.  
[Insert Table 11] 
4.6.6. Other Results  
a. Family Firms  
In addition to previous results, we investigate the impact of family firms on the 
effectiveness of internal governance. Previous studies show that family firms tend to be less 
innovative firms. Chen and Hsu (2009), Chrisman and Patel (2012), and Munari, Oriani, and 
Sobrero (2010) show that family firms tend to invest less in R&D. Duran, Kammerlander, van 
Essen and Zellweger (2015) find that the innovativeness of family firms depends on the level of 
control, wealth concentration, and the importance of non-financial goals. To test this relationship, 
we use a family firm dataset collected from Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) and Anderson, Reeb, 
and Zhao (2012). Consistent with the previous literature, our untabulated results (for brevity) find 
that family firms tend to be less efficient in generating patents, citations, and market value from 
their R&D investments. Further, we find internal governance is not effective in reversing the 
negative effect of family firms on innovation efficiency. We find that the interaction terms between 
the family firm indicator variable and the difference in horizons measured by age difference are 
always statistically insignificant.    
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b. High-tech Industries  
Innovation process differs from one industry to another. For example, the innovation 
process in high-tech industries is critical to firm growth and survival. The demand for innovation 
in high-tech industries may have a positive or negative impact on firm’s innovation efficiency. As 
high-tech industries tend to produce more innovative products, they may build the know-how of 
innovation. Building on their previous success, firms in high-tech industries may become more 
efficient in allocating investment in high-rewarding projects. On the other hand, these firms may 
face pressure from the market to invest more in innovative activities. Such pressure may lead to 
inefficient allocation of firms’ R&D to chase innovation. To test this relationship and its impact 
on the relationship between internal governance and innovation efficiency, we follow Shen and 
Zhang (2017) and create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is part of the 
seven industry classifications (industries with three-digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 
and 737).14  
Our results (untabulated for brevity) suggest that high-tech industries are less efficient in 
allocating firms’ investments. Or it might be mechanical because high-tech industries have much 
higher R&D investments, and the firms in the industry might be reluctant to apply for patents to 
avoid severe competition. We find that the coefficients of the high-tech indicator variable are 
negative and statistically significant for all measures of innovation efficiency. We also find that 
internal governance coefficients are still positive and statistically significant. The interaction term 
between the age difference and high-tech indicator variable is statistically insignificant for all 
measures of innovation efficiency, suggesting that the effectiveness of internal governance is 
indifferent between high-tech industries and other industries. Our results are consistent with 
previous studies (He and Tian 2013; Fang, Tian, and Tice 2014) that argue that excessive 
monitoring from the market may hinder innovation. 
5. Conclusion  
Previous theoretical (Acharya, Myers, and Rajan 2011; Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009) 
and empirical evidence (Masulis and Mobbs 2011; Landier et al. 2013) suggest that internal 
                                                          14 SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, and 737 represent firms operating in Drugs, Computer and Office Equipment, Communication Equipment, Electronic Components and Accessories, Laboratory, Optic, Measure, Control Instruments, and Computer Programming and Data Processing, respectively. 
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governance exercised by senior non-CEO executives can form a counterpower to myopic CEO 
behavior. In this study, we investigate the relationship between internal governance exercised by 
senior non-CEO executives and innovation efficiency. Our study provides empirical evidence that 
subordinated managers’ expected employment horizon relative to that of CEO, is an important 
determinant of innovation efficiency. Using a rich original panel dataset of major US firms 
included in S&P 1500 from 1992 to 2010, we find a strong positive association between the 
difference in horizons within the top management team and innovation efficiency. Our results are 
robust to alternative measures of horizon, and measures of innovation efficiency.  
Our results indicate that the internal governance is contingent on the composition of the 
top management team. We find that internal governance is effective when the subordinate 
managers’ expected horizon exceeds the CEO’s horizon. Moreover, internal governance is 
effective only when an elder or generalist CEO lead the firm. On the other hand, the presence of 
powerful CEOs attenuates the effect of internal governance on innovation efficiency. In addition, 
even firms led by overconfident CEOs still benefit from internal governance in improving the 
quantity and scientific value of the innovation. Thus, overconfident CEOs have limited ability to 
weaken or undermine the effort of internal governance inside the firm on innovation. To rule out 
the alternative explanation that our results are driven by self-selection of young non-CEO 
executives, who choose to work in an efficient, innovative firm, we conduct propensity score 
matching and 2SLS regression analysis using the ratio of average consumer price index (CPI) in 
the birth year of subordinate managers divided by the CPI in the year when the CEO was born, as 
an instrument. The additional tests suggest that self-selection of non-CEO executives does not 
drive our results.     
Our study contributes to the literature by examining the impact of internal governance on 
innovation efficiency. Our findings shed light on how the top management team can work together 
and shape the corporate strategy that boosts the long-term growth and competitiveness of a firm. 
Departing from previous research that usually emphasizes CEOs or views executives as a unified 
team, we provide evidence that subordinate managers play an important monitoring role on the 
CEOs from the bottom up and that effective internal governance can positively impact firms’ 
innovation efficiency. 
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics This table presents descriptive statistics of S&P 1500 firms available on ExecuComp during 1992–2010. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% values. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Variable Min 25th Mean Median S.D. 75th Max 
Innovation 
ܲܣܶ 1.00 2.00 42.73 7.00 109.52 27.00 746.00 
ܶܥܹ 1.00 4.86 99.03 16.56 258.62 63.19 1780.99 
ܶܵܯ 0.51 7.09 740.52 34.76 2339.14 245.39 16034.39 
R&D 0.00 3.12 143.49 20.65 439.94 72.69 3348.00 
ܲܣܶ ܴ&ܦ⁄  0.00 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.38 5.34 
ܶܥܹ ܴ&ܦ⁄  0.00 0.20 0.99 0.48 4.88 1.02 343.58 
ܶܵܯ ܴ&ܦ⁄  0.01 0.37 2.49 1.04 5.46 2.59 239.50 
Top Management Team Characteristics 
CEO’s Age 39.00 49.00 53.71 54.00 6.57 58.00 72.00 
CEO’s Delta 0 67.66 1202.20 177.76 12675.23 479.13 515556 
CEO’s Vega 0 10.87 101.63 34.65 244.45 96.85 11262 CEO’s GAI -1.50 -0.71 0.02 -0.16 1.00 0.54 6.87 
Non-CEO Age 37.29 46.25 49.91 50.00 5.39 53.50 63.67 Difference in Horizons -13.50 -1.00 3.86 3.75 7.17 8.33 23.00 Rem. Horizon 1.33 11.50 15.09 15.00 5.39 18.75 27.71 
Ind. Adj. Sub Age -14.00 -3.50 -0.16 0.00 5.40 3.50 12.50 Pay ratio 0.36 1.65 2.64 2.28 1.66 3.11 11.07 
External Governance 
Analyst Coverage 1.00 4.00 9.84 8.00 7.36 14.00 48.00 Institutional Ownership 0.00 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.22 0.81 1.00 Control Variables  
HHI 0.04 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.35 1.00 
Stk. Ret -0.79 -0.16 0.18 0.10 0.58 0.39 2.66 
Ln(Sales) 14.39 17.37 18.45 18.40 1.64 19.51 22.53 
Leverage 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.33 0.89 
Tobin Q 0.70 1.20 2.07 1.60 1.45 2.36 8.78 
ROA -0.35 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.37 
Tangibles 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.41 0.88 
Z- Score -4.63 2.23 5.16 3.61 5.85 5.91 35.78 
Interest Coverage -0.80 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.23 0.18 1.35 
Cash 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.76 
Invest 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.30 
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Table 2: Difference in Horizons This table reports the regression results for the relationship between executives’ horizon and firms’ innovation efficiency. The difference in horizons is measured by the age difference between the CEO and his or her immediate non-CEO executives. Panel A presents the quantity and scientific value of innovation efficiency measured by the log of number of patents in t+1 and t+2 deflated by R&D expenses in year t and citation-weighted patents in t+1 and t+2 deflated by R&D expenses in year t. Panel B presents the regression results for the market value of innovation efficiency measured by the log of the stock market reaction of the granted patent in t+1 and t+2 deflated by R&D expenses in year t. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Panel A: Quantity and Quality of Innovation  ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)              Diff in Horizons 0.041
*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.040*** 0.069*** 0.083*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.094*** (4.55) (4.26) (4.62) (5.27) (5.78) (5.81) (4.49) (5.36) (6.15) (5.18) (6.37) (6.70) 
CEO’s Age  -0.169 -0.178  -0.334*** -0.355***  -0.332*** -0.365***  -0.423*** -0.449***  (-1.56) (-1.57)  (-2.96) (-2.99)  (-3.13) (-3.32)  (-3.86) (-3.93) CEO’s Delta   0.002   -0.001   -0.003   -0.007   (0.23)   (-0.06)   (-0.4)   (-0.79) CEO’s Vega   0.018
*   0.017   0.012   0.012   (1.78)   (1.57)   (1.24)   (1.15) 
HHI 0.003 0.004 -0.018 -0.032 -0.030 -0.056* 0.023 0.025 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.021 (0.1) (0.14) (-0.59) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-1.73) (0.82) (0.9) (0.06) (-0.15) (-0.05) (-0.66) 
Stk. Ret -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.024** (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.04) (2.15) (2.08) (1.96) (1.58) (1.53) (1.63) (2.67) (2.58) (2.35) Analyst Cov. 0.013 0.014 0.001 0.020 0.021 0.004 0.038
* 0.040* 0.030 0.038 0.040* 0.023 (0.57) (0.61) (0.06) (0.80) (0.87) (0.16) (1.66) (1.75) (1.27) (1.6) (1.7) (0.92) Instit. Owners -0.164
*** -0.166*** -0.153*** -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.121*** -0.126*** -0.117*** (-4.52) (-4.59) (-3.91) (-4.06) (-4.17) (-3.38) (-4.02) (-4.16) (-3.81) (-3.28) (-3.42) (-2.98) 
Ln (Sales) -1.152*** -1.122*** -1.117*** -1.055*** -0.990*** -0.925*** -1.079*** -1.020*** -0.980*** -0.929*** -0.847*** -0.721*** (-6.38) (-6.18) (-5.66) (-5.52) (-5.15) (-4.4) (-6.08) (-5.72) (-5.11) (-4.99) (-4.52) (-3.57) 
Leverage -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.021 -0.022 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 (-0.81) (-0.84) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-1.33) (-1.39) (-0.86) (-0.43) (-0.5) (-0.43) 
Tobin Q -0.047* -0.048* -0.064** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.044* -0.046* -0.063** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.086*** (-1.89) (-1.93) (-2.46) (-3.44) (-3.5) (-3.69) (-1.79) (-1.86) (-2.46) (-3.13) (-3.22) (-3.2) 
ROA -0.014 -0.014 -0.020 0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.026* -0.026* -0.029** -0.015 -0.015 -0.024 (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.4) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.52) (-1.95) (-1.93) (-2.08) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.6) 
Tangibles 0.222*** 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.201*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.160*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.136*** 0.145*** 0.134*** (7.5) (7.61) (7.35) (6.45) (6.67) (6.1) (5.51) (5.77) (5.48) (4.47) (4.77) (4.15) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.101*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.128*** (3.17) (3.19) (3.67) (4.25) (4.3) (4.64) (4.62) (4.67) (5.34) (6.02) (6.09) (6.36) -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 
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Interest Cov. (-0.14) (-0.17) (0.06) (-1.33) (-1.39) (-0.62) (0.06) (0.00) (0.10) (-1.22) (-1.3) (-0.55) 
Cash -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.047** 0.046** 0.054*** (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.22) (1.11) (1.1) (1.22) (1.47) (1.48) (1.45) (2.5) (2.49) (2.73) 
Invest -0.039** -0.041** -0.039** -0.003 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.008 0.024 0.019 0.034* (-2.13) (-2.26) (-2.01) (-0.13) (-0.35) (0.24) (-0.41) (-0.68) (-0.41) (1.29) (1.01) (1.73) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.680 0.674 0.677 0.678 0.667 0.692 0.692 0.692 0.694 0.695 0.692 N 5801 5801 5429 5348 5348 4990 5801 5801 5429 5348 5348 4990 
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Panel B: Market Value of Innovation 
 ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       Diff in Horizons 0.017
** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.017** 0.048*** 0.045*** (2.53) (3.68) (3.79) (2.28) (4.43) (3.98) 
CEO’s Age  -0.214*** -0.224***  -0.353*** -0.342***  (-2.67) (-2.72)  (-3.94) (-3.71) 
CEO’s Delta   0.000   0.002   (0.06)   (0.27) 
CEO’s Vega   0.024***   0.009   (3.27)   (1.13) 
HHI 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 (0.37) (0.44) (0.03) (0.08) (0.17) (0.21) 
Stk. Ret 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052*** (6.34) (6.29) (6.52) (6.27) (6.19) (6.18) Analyst Cov. 0.140
*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.144*** (8.17) (8.24) (7.88) (7.61) (7.72) (7.24) Instit. Owners -0.043 -0.046
* -0.031 -0.060** -0.064** -0.050 (-1.58) (-1.69) (-1.1) (-2) (-2.15) (-1.59) 
Ln (Sales) 2.981*** 3.018*** 2.933*** 2.575*** 2.643*** 2.647*** (22.21) (22.38) (20.4) (16.93) (17.3) (16.22) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014 -0.009 (-0.96) (-1.02) (-0.65) (-0.94) (-1.02) (-0.66) 
Tobin Q 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.233*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.199*** (13.16) (13.1) (12.22) (9.92) (9.85) (9.16) 
ROA -0.021** -0.021** -0.026** -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 (-2.1) (-2.08) (-2.44) (-0.89) (-0.9) (-1.24) 
Tangibles 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.070*** (2.88) (3.11) (2.8) (2.69) (3) (2.69) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.064*** (4.24) (4.28) (4.73) (3.44) (3.51) (3.91) Interest Cov. -0.017
** -0.018** -0.017** -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* (-2.46) (-2.51) (-2.3) (-1.83) (-1.92) (-1.68) 
Cash 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** (4.05) (4.05) (3.46) (3.05) (3.04) (2.95) 
Invest 0.007 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 (0.49) (0.25) (0.18) (-0.15) (-0.43) (-0.07) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.824 0.824 0.827 0.796 0.797 0.799 N 5801 5801 5429 5348 5348 4990 
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Table 3: Positive vs. Negative Difference in Horizons This table reports the regression results for positive and negative differences in horizon samples. Panel A (Panel B) presents the regression results for positive age difference (negative age difference). We replace the negative age difference by the absolute value of age difference. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Panel A: Positive Difference in Horizons  
Variables ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons 0.058
*** 0.090*** 0.067*** 0.088*** 0.052*** 0.048*** (3.49) (5.26) (4.07) (5.20) (3.93) (3.26) 
HHI -0.000 -0.035 0.023 -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 (0.00) (-0.97) (0.67) (-0.34) (-0.09) (-0.13) 
Stk. Ret -0.005 0.029** 0.015 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.056*** (-0.43) (2.47) (1.38) (3.17) (5.4) (5.59) Analyst Cov. 0.021 0.016 0.034 0.030 0.155
*** 0.152*** (0.78) (0.55) (1.28) (1.08) (7.26) (6.31) Instit. Owners -0.227
*** -0.205*** -0.190*** -0.169*** -0.058* -0.070* (-5.21) (-4.61) (-4.41) (-3.87) (-1.68) (-1.83) 
Ln(Sales) -1.223*** -1.059*** -1.036*** -0.883*** 2.956*** 2.533*** (-5.73) (-4.75) (-4.91) (-4.02) (17.58) (13.28) 
Leverage 0.001 0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 (0.05) (0.25) (-0.35) (0.30) (-0.24) (-0.1) 
Tobin Q -0.038 -0.107*** -0.041 -0.094*** 0.261*** 0.210*** (-1.25) (-3.37) (-1.38) (-2.99) (10.94) (7.69) 
ROA -0.004 0.017 -0.015 -0.001 -0.012 -0.005 (-0.25) (1.00) (-0.92) (-0.07) (-0.95) (-0.37) 
Tangibles 0.187*** 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.042 0.015 -0.012 (5.21) (3.22) (3.2) (1.13) (0.51) (-0.39) 
Z- Score 0.031 0.073*** 0.048** 0.092*** 0.027 0.040* (1.36) (3.02) (2.11) (3.87) (1.5) (1.91) Interest Coverage -0.012 -0.019 -0.008 -0.018 -0.025
*** -0.025** (-1.06) (-1.6) (-0.72) (-1.57) (-2.77) (-2.51) 
Cash 0.005 0.019 0.048** 0.056** 0.048*** 0.025 (0.25) (0.85) (2.24) (2.53) (2.8) (1.34) 
Invest -0.028 0.012 0.012 0.046** 0.007 -0.006 (-1.24) (0.53) (0.54) (2.02) (0.4) (-0.29) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.695 0.702 0.702 0.710 0.811 0.782 N 4020 3704 4020 3704 4020 3704 
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Panel B: Negative Difference in Horizons 
Variables ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons 0.039 -0.028 -0.004 -0.056
** 0.024 -0.024 (1.48) (-1.00) (-0.15) (-2.08) (1.41) (-1.28) 
HHI 0.022 -0.016 0.035 0.012 0.037 0.021 (0.41) (-0.27) (0.68) (0.21) (1.07) (0.53) 
Stk. Ret 0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.002 0.036*** 0.034** (0.21) (0.41) (0.24) (-0.12) (3.06) (2.58) Analyst Cov. 0.019 0.040 0.076
* 0.074 0.122*** 0.148*** (0.44) (0.83) (1.77) (1.6) (4.21) (4.52) Instit. Owners -0.109 -0.098 -0.136
** -0.074 -0.064 -0.077 (-1.53) (-1.27) (-1.98) (-1) (-1.38) (-1.47) 
Ln(Sales) -0.665* -0.644 -0.847** -0.576 3.117*** 2.566*** (-1.81) (-1.59) (-2.38) (-1.49) (13.01) (9.39) 
Leverage -0.042 -0.043 -0.070** -0.058* -0.040* -0.055** (-1.30) (-1.25) (-2.25) (-1.75) (-1.9) (-2.38) 
Tobin Q -0.047 -0.050 -0.030 -0.048 0.228*** 0.206*** (-1.06) (-1.05) (-0.71) (-1.05) (7.9) (6.35) 
ROA -0.049* -0.047 -0.068*** -0.060** -0.027 0.006 (-1.79) (-1.61) (-2.58) (-2.16) (-1.54) (0.3) 
Tangibles 0.368*** 0.387*** 0.309*** 0.339*** 0.175*** 0.205*** (6.45) (6.22) (5.59) (5.71) (4.72) (4.9) 
Z- Score 0.100*** 0.089** 0.132*** 0.146*** 0.085*** 0.051** (3.06) (2.42) (4.15) (4.16) (3.96) (2.08) Interest Coverage 0.027 0.005 0.024 0.003 -0.002 0.013 (1.52) (0.26) (1.4) (0.19) (-0.19) (1) 
Cash 0.039 0.086** 0.032 0.079** 0.100*** 0.110*** (1.1) (2.25) (0.94) (2.16) (4.38) (4.3) 
Invest -0.060* -0.005 -0.031 0.011 0.013 0.037 (-1.8) (-0.15) (-0.94) (0.31) (0.60) (1.48) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.699 0.678 0.718 0.706 0.873 0.854 N 1684 1559 1684 1559 1684 1559 
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Table 4: Endogeneity  Panel A presents the results for propensity score matching. Average treatment effect (ATE) is reported with z-statistics in parentheses. In the first step, a logit model is used to calculate the propensity score using all the control variables in our baseline specification. In the second step, the difference in innovation efficiency between high and low internal governance firms is reported. High (low) internal governance is defined as firms with above (below) median difference in horizon. Panel B presents the results of instrumental-variable regression. We treat difference in horizon measured by the age difference between the CEO and his or her immediate non-CEO executives as an endogenous variable. We use industry-adjusted age difference as an instrumental variable. Ind. adjusted age difference is defined as the difference between the average non-CEO executives’ age in each firm and the average age of peers of non-CEO executives in the same industry.  Panel A: Propensity Score Matching  ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        
ATE 0.063* 0.084*** 0.059* 0.099*** 0.062** 0.070*** (1.91) (2.89) (1.91) (3.42) (2.39) (2.61) Panel B: 2SLS – Instrumental Variable Regression  1st Stage 2nd Stage   ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ         
CPI (Sub/CEO) 0.832       (107.34)       Diff in Horizon (Instrumented)  0.036
** 0.053*** 0.037** 0.051*** 0.028** 0.027**  (2.40) (3.26) (2.230) (3.071) (2.219) (1.970) 
HHI 0.053 0.003 -0.026 0.020 -0.004 0.007 0.002 (3.14) (0.12) (-1.09) (0.860) (-0.145) (0.381) (0.079) 
Stk. Ret -0.001 -0.002 0.030* 0.021 0.038** 0.070*** 0.079*** (-0.08) (-0.18) (1.91) (1.362) (2.312) (5.570) (5.335) 
Analyst Coverage 0.030 0.011 0.015 0.030* 0.030* 0.117*** 0.121*** (2.85) (0.73) (0.97) (1.886) (1.792) (7.769) (7.542) 
Instit. Own -0.004 -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.056*** -0.021 -0.030* (-0.35) (-4.14) (-3.82) (-3.569) (-2.917) (-1.511) (-1.876) 
Ln(Sales) -0.035 -0.143*** -0.129*** -0.143*** -0.121*** 0.416*** 0.355*** (-2.49) (-6.53) (-5.64) (-6.262) (-5.134) (21.421) (16.885) 
Leverage 0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.023 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 (0.49) (-0.72) (-0.39) (-1.236) (-0.398) (-1.002) (-0.995) 
Tobin Q -0.021 -0.034* -0.063*** -0.033 -0.059*** 0.196*** 0.164*** (-1.87) (-1.75) (-3.05) (-1.552) (-2.644) (11.280) (8.843) 
ROA 0.012 -0.014 0.001 -0.028* -0.015 -0.025* -0.012 (1.32) (-0.97) (0.04) (-1.765) (-0.875) (-1.947) (-0.862) 
Tangibles -0.011 0.237*** 0.211*** 0.182*** 0.151*** 0.078*** 0.080** (-0.53) (6.53) (5.84) (4.844) (4.020) (2.619) (2.499) 
Z- Score -0.005 0.053** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.108*** 0.061*** 0.054*** (-0.39) (2.56) (3.34) (3.359) (4.380) (3.531) (3.022) 
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Interest Coverage 0.001 -0.002 -0.022 0.001 -0.021 -0.033** -0.028** (0.09) (-0.15) (-1.48) (0.045) (-1.410) (-2.561) (-1.985) 
Cash 0.021 -0.004 0.019 0.025 0.044** 0.057*** 0.048*** (1.97) (-0.27) (1.17) (1.374) (2.417) (3.989) (2.921) 
Investment 0.032 -0.045* -0.003 -0.009 0.029 0.009 -0.003 (2.22) (-1.860) (-0.11) (-0.339) (1.065) (0.465) (-0.144) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y F-stat (P-value)  0.000       R2  0.031 0.032 0.042 0.045 0.364 0.300 N 5801 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348  
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Table 5: Alternative Measures of Horizon This table presents regression results for measures of non-executives’ horizon. Scaled Diff in Horizon is the age difference between the CEO and his or her immediate non-CEO executives scaled by CEO’s age. Sub. Age is the average of non-CEO executives’ (subordinate managers) age, and Sub. remaining horizon is the difference between the expected retirement age of 65 and the average subordinate managers’ age. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ 
Panel A: Scaled Diff in Horizon Scaled Diff in Horizon 0.036
*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.013** 0.013* (4.10) (4.55) (4.00) (4.58) (2.06) (1.79) Control Y Y Y Y Y Y SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.677 0.691 0.6938 0.824 0.796 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 Panel B: Sub. Age 
Sub. Age -0.294*** -0.437*** -0.404*** -0.489*** -0.222*** -0.298*** (-3.43) (-4.93) (-4.82) (-5.66) (-3.49) (-4.23) Control  Y Y Y Y Y Y SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.677 0.693 0.694 0.824 0.797 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 
Panel C: Sub. Remaining Horizon 
Sub. remaining horizon 0.090
*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.151*** 0.068*** 0.092*** (3.43) (4.93) (4.82) (5.66) (3.49) (4.23) Control  Y Y Y Y Y Y SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.677 0.692 0.694 0.824 0.797 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 
Panel D: Sub. Ind. Adj. Horizon 
Sub. Ind. Adj. horizon 0.035
*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.024*** 0.031*** (4.11) (5.48) (5.18) (6.12) (3.86) (4.47) Control  Y Y Y Y Y Y SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.677 0.692 0.695 0.824 0.797 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348   
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Table 6: Alternative Measures of Innovation Efficiency  This table presents regression results for an alternative measure of innovation efficiency - Research Quotient (RQ). RQ is defined as the percentage increase in revenue from a 1% increase in R&D. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  RQt+1 RQt+2 RQt+1 RQt+2 RQt+1 RQt+2 RQt+1 RQt+2 RQt+1 RQt+2            
Diff in Horizons 0.042*** 0.036***         (4.24) (3.45)         
CEO’s Age -0.276*** -0.262***         (-3.46) (-3.11)         Scaled Diff in Horizon   0.016
** 0.011*         (2.54) (1.66)       
Sub. Age     -0.281*** -0.252***         (-4.40) (-3.73)     Remaining Horizon       0.084
*** 0.075***         (4.40) (3.73)   Sub. Ind. Adj. horizon         0.023
*** 0.022***         (3.93) (3.48) 
HHI 0.036* 0.048** 0.036* 0.048** 0.036* 0.048** 0.036* 0.048** 0.037* 0.050** (1.75) (2.23) (1.74) (2.22) (1.75) (2.24) (1.75) (2.24) (1.83) (2.31) 
Stk. Ret 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.012* 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.012 (0.67) (1.61) (0.75) (1.68) (0.66) (1.61) (0.66) (1.61) (0.68) (1.63) Analyst Coverage -0.039
** -0.044*** -0.038** -0.044*** -0.039** -0.044*** -0.039** -0.044*** -0.038** -0.044*** (-2.44) (-2.63) (-2.42) (-2.61) (-2.44) (-2.64) (-2.44) (-2.64) (-2.4) (-2.61) 
Instit. Own 0.034 0.044 0.038 0.048* 0.033 0.044 0.033 0.044 0.035 0.045* (1.31) (1.61) (1.46) (1.75) (1.28) (1.6) (1.28) (1.6) (1.34) (1.65) 
Ln(Sales) 0.664*** 0.746*** 0.616*** 0.700*** 0.666*** 0.749*** 0.666*** 0.749*** 0.652*** 0.739*** (5.10) (5.42) (4.75) (5.11) (5.11) (5.44) (5.11) (5.44) (5.01) (5.37) 
Leverage -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035*** (-3.22) (-2.92) (-3.15) (-2.85) (-3.23) (-2.92) (-3.23) (-2.92) (-3.21) (-2.91) 
Tobin Q -0.021 -0.005 -0.020 -0.004 -0.022 -0.005 -0.022 -0.005 -0.021 -0.005 (-1.23) (-0.29) (-1.15) (-0.22) (-1.24) (-0.29) (-1.24) (-0.29) (-1.21) (-0.26) 
ROA 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.045*** (5.12) (4.22) (5.04) (4.15) (5.16) (4.23) (5.16) (4.23) (5.16) (4.24) 
Tangibles -0.209*** -0.199*** -0.215*** -0.204*** -0.208*** -0.198*** -0.208*** -0.198*** -0.211*** -0.200*** (-10.07) (-9.05) (-10.39) (-9.34) (-10.05) (-9.04) (-10.05) (-9.04) (-10.17) (-9.14) 
Z- Score 0.027** 0.019 0.027** 0.019 0.027** 0.019 0.027** 0.019 0.027** 0.018 (2.11) (1.4) (2.07) (1.36) (2.11) (1.39) (2.11) (1.39) (2.06) (1.35) 
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Interest Coverage 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 (0.27) (0.79) (0.32) (0.84) (0.27) (0.79) (0.27) (0.79) (0.29) (0.81) 
Cash 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 (0.15) (-0.01) (0.08) (-0.08) (0.16) (0) (0.16) (0) (0.12) (-0.03) 
Investment -0.003 0.011 0.001 0.014 -0.003 0.011 -0.003 0.011 -0.003 0.011 (-0.24) (0.76) (0.06) (1.03) (-0.27) (0.76) (-0.27) (0.76) (-0.20) (0.81) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.788 0.763 0.787 0.762 0.788 0.763 0.788 0.763 0.787 0.763 N 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 7553 
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Table 7: Internal Governance and CEO’s Horizon This table reports the regression results of the impact of CEO’s horizon on the relationship between innovation efficiency and the difference in horizon inside the top management team. Old CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s age is above the sample median age of CEOs, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Variables ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons x Old CEO 0.028 0.078
*** 0.039** 0.065*** 0.035** 0.046*** (1.50) (4.05) (2.14) (3.49) (2.55) (3.01) 
Diff in Horizons 0.025 0.010 0.024 0.020 -0.005 -0.004 (1.55) (0.62) (1.51) (1.21) (-0.42) (-0.29) 
Old CEO -0.012 -0.048*** -0.033** -0.053*** -0.012 -0.034*** (-0.74) (-2.92) (-2.11) (-3.28) (-1.02) (-2.62) 
HHI 0.003 -0.033 0.023 -0.005 0.008 0.001 (0.10) (-1.1) (0.81) (-0.16) (0.37) (0.06) 
Stk. Ret -0.002 0.022** 0.015 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.051*** (-0.19) (2.11) (1.56) (2.63) (6.34) (6.24) 
Analyst Cov. 0.012 0.017 0.037 0.037 0.139*** 0.146*** (0.53) (0.71) (1.62) (1.54) (8.1) (7.56) 
Instit. Owners -0.164*** -0.156*** -0.144*** -0.123*** -0.043 -0.062** (-4.53) (-4.14) (-4.05) (-3.34) (-1.59) (-2.06) 
Ln(Sales) -1.129*** -0.969*** -1.025*** -0.841*** 3.006*** 2.633*** (-6.2) (-5.03) (-5.73) (-4.49) (22.22) (17.19) 
Leverage -0.013 -0.009 -0.022 -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 (-0.82) (-0.5) (-1.35) (-0.5) (-0.98) (-1) 
Tobin Q -0.046* -0.089*** -0.043* -0.079*** 0.244*** 0.210*** (-1.87) (-3.37) (-1.75) (-3.07) (13.2) (9.99) 
ROA -0.015 -0.001 -0.027** -0.015 -0.021** -0.011 (-1.07) (-0.04) (-1.99) (-1.08) (-2.11) (-0.93) 
Tangibles 0.221*** 0.202*** 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.062*** 0.068*** (7.47) (6.45) (5.55) (4.53) (2.82) (2.73) 
Z- Score 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.114*** 0.057*** 0.053*** (3.11) (4.1) (4.55) (5.91) (4.13) (3.34) Interest Coverage -0.001 -0.014 0.000 -0.012 -0.017
** -0.015* (-0.14) (-1.36) (0.05) (-1.27) (-2.44) (-1.87) 
Cash -0.003 0.024 0.028 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.048*** (-0.15) (1.27) (1.59) (2.63) (4.18) (3.16) 
Invest -0.038** -0.002 -0.008 0.024 0.008 -0.002 (-2.09) (-0.1) (-0.43) (1.27) (0.56) (-0.15) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.678 0.692 0.695 0.824 0.797 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 
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Table 8: Internal Governance and CEO Power This table reports the regression results of the impact of CEO’s power measured by CEO’s total pay. CEO power is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s total pay is above the sample median value of other CEOs in the same operating industry during the same year, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons x CEO Power -0.029
** -0.031** -0.031** -0.028** -0.017* -0.013 (-2.31) (-2.36) (-2.48) (-2.2) (-1.79) (-1.25) 
Diff in Horizons 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.029*** 0.026** (4.84) (5.38) (4.9) (5.18) (3) (2.46) 
CEO Power 0.025 0.015 0.041** 0.032** 0.049*** 0.030** (1.57) (0.91) (2.57) (1.97) (4.12) (2.25) 
HHI 0.003 -0.033 0.023 -0.004 0.008 0.002 (0.1) (-1.09) (0.82) (-0.14) (0.39) (0.1) 
Stk. Ret -0.002 0.022** 0.015 0.027*** 0.045*** 0.051*** (-0.18) (2.18) (1.56) (2.67) (6.24) (6.24) 
Analyst Cov. 0.013 0.020 0.037 0.038 0.139*** 0.147*** (0.57) (0.81) (1.64) (1.59) (8.12) (7.6) 
Instit. Owners -0.169*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.128*** -0.060** -0.070** (-4.58) (-4.02) (-4.26) (-3.44) (-2.19) (-2.29) 
Ln(Sales) -1.201*** -1.061*** -1.191*** -1.014*** 2.803*** 2.469*** (-6.28) (-5.24) (-6.34) (-5.15) (19.74) (15.35) 
Leverage -0.014 -0.008 -0.022 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014 (-0.86) (-0.46) (-1.41) (-0.49) (-1.07) (-1) 
Tobin Q -0.048* -0.091*** -0.046* -0.083*** 0.239*** 0.207*** (-1.93) (-3.45) (-1.89) (-3.2) (12.94) (9.81) 
ROA -0.014 0.000 -0.024* -0.013 -0.019* -0.009 (-1.00) (0.00) (-1.81) (-0.94) (-1.82) (-0.75) 
Tangibles 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.164*** 0.138*** 0.069*** 0.070*** (7.54) (6.42) (5.63) (4.53) (3.14) (2.81) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.116*** 0.059*** 0.054*** (3.17) (4.25) (4.62) (6.03) (4.26) (3.45) 
Interest Coverage -0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.012 -0.017** -0.014* (-0.11) (-1.32) (0.12) (-1.19) (-2.37) (-1.78) 
Cash -0.004 0.021 0.026 0.046** 0.054*** 0.045*** (-0.23) (1.11) (1.45) (2.45) (3.97) (2.97) 
Invest -0.039** -0.002 -0.008 0.024 0.005 -0.003 (-2.15) (-0.11) (-0.46) (1.27) (0.37) (-0.19) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.680 0.678 0.692 0.694 0.824 0.796 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 
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Table 9: Internal Governance and non-CEO inside Directors This table reports the regression results of the impact of non-CEO inside directors on the relationship between the difference in horizons and innovation efficiency. # inside directors is the number of non-CEO inside directors. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons x # Inside directors 0.028
*** 0.022** 0.025** 0.018* 0.012 0.008 (2.82) (2.08) (2.54) (1.82) (1.62) (0.99) 
Diff in Horizons 0.026** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.013 0.016* (2.43) (3.44) (2.59) (3.54) (1.64) (1.73) 
# Inside directors 0.009 0.019 0.014 0.021* 0.027*** 0.030*** (0.78) (1.59) (1.24) (1.84) (3.16) (3.12) 
HHI -0.002 -0.034 0.020 -0.005 0.006 0.002 (-0.08) (-1.13) (0.7) (-0.17) (0.29) (0.1) 
Stk. Ret -0.002 0.021** 0.015 0.026** 0.046*** 0.051*** (-0.24) (2.01) (1.56) (2.57) (6.38) (6.25) 
Analyst Cov. 0.014 0.019 0.036 0.036 0.137*** 0.144*** (0.6) (0.77) (1.59) (1.5) (7.96) (7.39) 
Instit. Owners -0.150*** -0.138*** -0.131*** -0.107*** -0.032 -0.050 (-4.13) (-3.64) (-3.67) (-2.88) (-1.18) (-1.64) 
Ln(Sales) -1.158*** -1.059*** -1.077*** -0.925*** 2.992*** 2.590*** (-6.42) (-5.54) (-6.07) (-4.97) (22.25) (17) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.006 -0.020 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 (-0.76) (-0.36) (-1.27) (-0.38) (-0.92) (-0.89) 
Tobin Q -0.048* -0.091*** -0.044* -0.081*** 0.243*** 0.209*** (-1.92) (-3.44) (-1.81) (-3.12) (13.14) (9.92) 
ROA -0.016 -0.001 -0.027** -0.016 -0.023** -0.012 (-1.15) (-0.1) (-2.03) (-1.14) (-2.25) (-1.03) 
Tangibles 0.225*** 0.204*** 0.161*** 0.136*** 0.060*** 0.063** (7.64) (6.54) (5.55) (4.48) (2.73) (2.53) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.116*** 0.057*** 0.053*** (3.18) (4.26) (4.59) (5.98) (4.12) (3.34) 
Interest Coverage -0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.012 -0.017** -0.015* (-0.11) (-1.34) (0.08) (-1.23) (-2.43) (-1.84) 
Cash -0.004 0.021 0.027 0.047** 0.056*** 0.048*** (-0.25) (1.08) (1.49) (2.51) (4.11) (3.11) 
Invest -0.043** -0.006 -0.010 0.022 0.006 -0.003 (-2.33) (-0.3) (-0.53) (1.18) (0.45) (-0.16) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.682 0.679 0.692 0.695 0.823 0.796 N 5772 5321 5772 5321 5772 5321 
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Table 10: Internal Governance and the CEO’s Ability This table reports the regression results of the impact of CEO’s abilities, measured by the General Ability index from Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013), on the relationship between innovation efficiency and the difference in horizons inside the top management team. GAI is an indicator variable that classifies the CEO as a Generalist and takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s GAI score is above the sample GAI median, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons  x GAI 0.031
* 0.057*** 0.041*** 0.064*** 0.016 0.023* (1.95) (3.55) (2.72) (4.18) (1.44) (1.90) 
Diff in Horizons  0.012 0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.006 0.004 (0.79) (0.06) (0.6) (-0.10) (0.56) (0.33) 
GAI -0.055*** -0.088*** -0.085*** -0.110*** -0.032*** -0.049*** (-3.3) (-5.14) (-5.23) (-6.7) (-2.67) (-3.76) 
HHI -0.036 -0.067* -0.019 -0.038 -0.020 -0.029 (-1) (-1.77) (-0.54) (-1.04) (-0.76) (-1.02) 
Stk. Ret 0.016 0.024** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.056*** 0.054*** (1.42) (2.08) (3.01) (2.65) (6.92) (6.12) 
Analyst Cov. -0.022 -0.009 0.011 0.018 0.102*** 0.119*** (-0.77) (-0.32) (0.38) (0.66) (5.04) (5.4) 
Instit. Owners -0.148*** -0.159*** -0.085* -0.102** -0.033 -0.043 (-3.25) (-3.38) (-1.93) (-2.29) (-1.01) (-1.22) 
Ln(Sales) -0.689*** -0.727*** -0.619*** -0.660*** 3.195*** 2.848*** (-3.1) (-3.18) (-2.86) (-3.02) (20.27) (16.62) 
Leverage -0.028 -0.013 -0.030 -0.016 -0.009 -0.003 (-1.40) (-0.63) (-1.53) (-0.82) (-0.64) (-0.17) 
Tobin Q -0.058* -0.087*** -0.065** -0.081*** 0.245*** 0.206*** (-1.9) (-2.78) (-2.19) (-2.69) (11.33) (8.73) 
ROA -0.036** -0.014 -0.046*** -0.020 -0.021* -0.016 (-2.12) (-0.77) (-2.77) (-1.18) (-1.69) (-1.22) 
Tangibles 0.164*** 0.147*** 0.086** 0.065* 0.008 0.023 (4.49) (3.95) (2.43) (1.84) (0.31) (0.81) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.095*** 0.100*** 0.055*** 0.058*** (2.61) (3.27) (4.34) (4.51) (3.42) (3.34) Interest Coverage 0.006 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.017
** -0.014 (0.53) (-0.33) (0.39) (-0.27) (-2.18) (-1.64) 
Cash 0.005 0.018 0.025 0.038* 0.060*** 0.039** (0.22) (0.84) (1.20) (1.79) (3.95) (2.33) 
Invest 0.005 0.029 0.030 0.048** 0.018 0.008 (0.21) (1.26) (1.40) (2.19) (1.14) (0.47) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.692 0.679 0.709 0.707 0.845 0.819 N 4136 4055 4136 4055 4136 4055  
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Table 11: Internal Governance and CEO’s Overconfidence This table reports the regression results of the impact of CEO’s overconfidence on the relationship between innovation efficiency and the difference in horizons inside the top management team. Overconfidence is an indicator variable that classifies the CEO as overconfident and takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s overconfidence score is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܲܣܶ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܥܹ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଵ ܶܵܯ ܧܨܨ௧ାଶ        Diff in Horizons  x Overconfidence -0.006 -0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 (-0.52) (-0.47) (0.48) (-0.31) (0.77) (-0.16) 
Diff in Horizons  0.045*** 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.013 0.018* (3.99) (4.52) (3.35) (4.36) (1.57) (1.92) 
Overconfidence -0.003 -0.000 -0.014 -0.010 0.025*** 0.018* (-0.21) (-0.01) (-1.21) (-0.83) (2.83) (1.85) 
HHI 0.003 -0.032 0.023 -0.005 0.009 0.002 (0.1) (-1.08) (0.81) (-0.16) (0.41) (0.1) 
Stk. Ret -0.001 0.022** 0.016* 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.049*** (-0.11) (2.17) (1.71) (2.79) (5.83) (5.98) 
Analyst Cov. 0.013 0.020 0.038* 0.038 0.139*** 0.147*** (0.58) (0.8) (1.68) (1.62) (8.12) (7.58) 
Instit. Owners -0.162*** -0.152*** -0.140*** -0.116*** -0.052* -0.067** (-4.44) (-4.01) (-3.9) (-3.13) (-1.94) (-2.21) 
Ln(Sales) -1.150*** -1.055*** -1.077*** -0.925*** 2.975*** 2.568*** (-6.37) (-5.51) (-6.07) (-4.97) (22.19) (16.89) 
Leverage -0.013 -0.007 -0.021 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013 (-0.82) (-0.43) (-1.34) (-0.45) (-0.89) (-0.92) 
Tobin Q -0.047* -0.091*** -0.042* -0.079*** 0.239*** 0.207*** (-1.87) (-3.43) (-1.72) (-3.08) (12.95) (9.81) 
ROA -0.014 0.000 -0.025* -0.013 -0.024** -0.012 (-1) (0.03) (-1.86) (-0.93) (-2.4) (-1.04) 
Tangibles 0.221*** 0.201*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 0.068*** 0.070*** (7.46) (6.42) (5.43) (4.39) (3.1) (2.82) 
Z- Score 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.061*** 0.056*** (3.15) (4.23) (4.57) (5.96) (4.4) (3.53) 
Interest Coverage -0.002 -0.013 -0.000 -0.013 -0.016** -0.014* (-0.16) (-1.34) (-0.02) (-1.28) (-2.27) (-1.72) 
Cash -0.004 0.021 0.026 0.047** 0.055*** 0.047*** (-0.23) (1.12) (1.45) (2.51) (4.07) (3.05) 
Invest -0.038** -0.002 -0.006 0.026 0.003 -0.004 (-2.1) (-0.12) (-0.32) (1.36) (0.26) (-0.29) SIC. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Adj-R2 0.68 0.677 0.692 0.694 0.824 0.796 N 5801 5348 5801 5348 5801 5348 
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Appendix  
Table A.1: This table presents summary statistics for our main measure of difference in horizons over the 1992-2010 period.   
Panel A: Difference in horizons by year  Year STD Q1 Mean Median Q3 1992 8.03 -3.00 2.50 2.55 7.50 1993 7.83 -2.00 3.00 3.00 7.83 1994 7.93 -1.75 3.50 3.67 8.33 1995 7.71 -1.50 3.69 4.00 8.50 1996 7.80 -1.00 3.91 4.00 8.79 1997 7.85 -1.00 3.99 4.00 9.00 1998 7.59 -0.75 4.18 4.50 9.00 1999 7.30 -0.50 4.18 4.00 9.00 2000 7.22 -0.67 4.27 4.33 8.82 2001 7.22 -0.50 4.23 4.50 8.67 2002 6.97 -0.25 4.33 4.50 8.67 2003 6.82 -0.33 4.39 4.25 8.75 2004 6.82 -0.75 4.13 3.80 8.50 2005 6.77 -0.67 4.08 3.80 8.33 2006 6.62 -0.75 3.83 3.50 8.00 2007 6.47 -1.20 3.29 2.75 7.55 2008 6.58 -0.80 3.53 3.00 7.67 2009 6.53 -0.50 3.72 3.46 7.75 2010 6.60 -0.40 3.89 3.50 7.80 Panel B: Difference in horizons by size quintiles  Size Quintiles STD Q1 Mean Median Q3 
1 (Small) 7.67 -1.00 4.09 4.00 9.00 2 7.70 -1.00 4.08 4.00 9.00 3 7.36 -0.83 4.05 4.00 8.75 4 6.86 -0.75 3.86 3.50 8.33 5 (Large) 6.22 -0.67 3.31 3.00 7.00 
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Table A2: Variable definitions 
Variable Description  Source PAT Number of patents  KPSS (2017) TCW Number of citation-weighted patents.  KPSS (2017) TSM The stock market reaction to granted patents. KPSS (2017) R&D Research and development expenses XRD.  Compustat 
PAT EFF୲ାଵ Log of number of Patents in t+1 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat 
PAT EFF୲ାଶ Log of number of Patents in t+ 2 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat 
TCW EFF୲ାଵ Log of the citation-weighted patent in t+1 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat 
TCW EFF୲ାଶ Log of the citation-weighted patent in t+2 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat 
TSM EFF୲ାଵ Log of the market value of patents in t+1 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat 
TSM EFF୲ାଶ Log of the market value of patents in t+2 deflated by research and development expenses in year t. KPSS (2017) and Compustat Research Quotient (QR)  Percentage increase in revenue from a 1% increase in R&D. RQ is the output elasticity of R&D. RQ offers a universal, uniform, and reliable measure of a firm's R&D productivity (Knott, 2008). Research Quotient – RQ – WRDS CEO’s age CEO’s age for a firm in a given year. ExecuComp CEO’s Delta The expected dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in stock sensitivity price. ExecuComp CEO’s Vega The expected dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return volatility. ExecuComp CEO’s GAI The CEO’s general ability index from Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013). ExecuComp Sub. Age The average age of top 4 non-CEO executives.  ExecuComp Difference in Horizons  The age difference between CEO’s age and the average age of top 4 non-CEO executives. ExecuComp Remaining Horizon The expected remaining subordinate managers’ horizon based on 65 as the age of retirement. ExecuComp Ind. Adjusted diff in Horizons The difference between non-CEO executives’ industry average age and firm non-CEO executives’ average age. ExecuComp Pay Ratio Ratio of CEO’s total compensation relative to the average non-CEO executives’ total compensation. ExecuComp Institutional Ownership Shares held by institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding.  TR13F Holdings 
Analyst Coverage Arithmetic mean of the 12-monthly numbers of earnings forecasts for firm i extracted from the IBES summary file over a fiscal year. IBES 
HHI Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared market shares of firms’ sales (Compustat SALE) at the two-digit SIC industry level. Compustat 
Stkret Stock return calculated as follows (((prcc_f/ADJEX_F) +(DVPSX_F/ADJEX_F))/(lagprcc_f/lagADJEX_F))-1 Compustat Ln (Sales) Log value of total sales calculated as log(100000*sale) Compustat 
55  
Leverage Total leverage deflated by total assets (dltt + dlc)/at Compustat Tobin Q Firm’s Tobin Q calculated as (lt-txditc+(prcc_f*csho))/at Compustat ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by the book value of total assets. Compustat 
Tangibles Property, plant, and equipment deflated by the book value of total assets  ppent/ at Compustat 
Z Score Kaplan-Zingales(1997) Index defined as  1.2*((act-lct)/at) +1.4*(re/at) +3.3*(pi/at) +0.6*((prcc_f*csho)/lt) +0.999*(sale/at) Compustat Interest Coverage Interest expenses divided by operating income.  Compustat Cash Cash holdings deflated by the book value of total assets. Compustat Invest Capital expenditure deflated by the book value of total assets.  Compustat  
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Figure 1: Mean and Median Age difference between the CEO and his or her subordinates over 1992-2010 period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: CEO vs subordinates’ age over 1992-2010 period  
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Figure 3: Mean and Median Patent Efficiency across age difference deciles over 1992-2010 period. 
 
Figure 4: Mean and Median Citation weighted patent Efficiency across age difference deciles over 1992-2010 period.  
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